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Writing these lines marks the end of an important and eventful period of my life. On
my journey toward this PhD thesis I have met many great people who made these years
wonderful and stimulating—be it with technical advice and discussions, or with friendship,
an open ear, and the occasional merrymaking. In the following paragraphs I want to
express my gratitude to some of these people.
First and foremost, I must thank my two supervisors. My discussions with Chris
Elbers have always been fruitful and inspiring. Chris’s own curiosity and enthusiasm for
problem solving never cease to amaze me. I remember once writing him to ask a technical
question, but realized soon after that he had just left for vacation. That did not stop
him from sending me a response a week later, on the day of his return. It contained a
10-pager outlining ideas and code run on simulated data, and the remark that he had a
fun vacation thinking about my problem.
Menno Pradhan is an excellent advisor for writing and ‘selling’ my work, and he
has helped me to assume a more pragmatic approach whenever I got side-tracked. We
certainly bonded during our research trip to Papua New Guinea, such as when Menno’s
suitcase got stolen on the first day so that we had to share all but a toothbrush, or when
I got dismally seasick during a diving excursion on our day off.
I am also thankful to Peter Lanjouw, who has helped me in shaping my third chapter
with various long discussions and detailed comments on an early draft. For a time it
almost seemed as if he was a third supervisor in disguise. Naturally, I am thankful to my
coauthors as well, especially to Eric Koomen, whose prowess in GIS analysis and untiring
attention to detail has been invaluable to the development of chapter four. The initiative
of Christopher Edmonds made the same chapter possible in the first place.
I owe a lot to the members of the economics department, and especially those of the
development group. The seminars, reading groups, the Monday morning meetings, and
everyone’s approachability have created an atmosphere that is welcoming and conducive
to analytical and critical thinking. I also want to thank Trudi Heemskerk, Pienke Dekkers,
Ester van den Bragt, and Judith van Kronenburg, whose reliable and patient support in
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all matters non-research saved the day for me on various occasions.
My time at the Vrije Universiteit would not have been what it was without my fel-
low PhD students. I have tons of great memories of conferences, workshops, and other
occasions with Lisette, Lukasz, and Zlata, or the ‘selfie group’. With my office mates
David and David of the ‘funky room’, I had lengthy political discussions and shared lots
of laughs and sarcasm. I cherish the positive vibes of both Philipp and Diana, two later
additions to the development group. I also want to mention Karolina, Paul, Simas, Bo,
Jurre, Zichen, Benjamin, Cindy, and Yeorim, who all made the VU a better place.
Going back further, I was lucky to have an awesome bunch of fellow MPhil students at
the Tinbergen Institute. Uwe has been a beacon of calm and wisdom, beside being a great
friend and awesome jazz pianist. With Travers, I cannot decide whether I respect him
more for being a brilliant researcher or a tireless party animal. I’m grateful to Guilherme,
Lenny, Stephanie, Ieva, and Simin, both for the countless hours of suffering productive
work during group assignments as well as for all the fun and silliness. Thanks also to
Alexandra, Swapnil, David, Sabina, Stephan, Pascal, Sandor, and Mehmet, for all the
good times inside and out of TI.
Beyond those already mentioned, I forged some friendships that elevated my time in
Amsterdam from good to terrific: Robin, with whom I first and truly discovered the heart
and soul of Amsterdam’s nightlife; Magda, whose many talents include managing a sailing
crew, improv acting at 5am, and being an awesome roommate; David, with whom I share
my obsession for a children’s card game; Aydan, who has a gift for telling stories, and
who always laughs about the same things as I; Gavin, who can fly a plane and once did
a looping with me in it; and Angelica, who never loses her calm or curses people, unless
threatened with a knife. This tight-knit group of friends, also known as the ‘vogels’, will
surely persist whatever the future might bring. Celia, Dario, Silvia, Gabriele, Thomas,
and Noor were also a part of this group, and I hope that our reunions will be many. Saskia
is the person who showed me that it is possible to live in Amsterdam’s city center and
not to be annoyed all the time.
I was fortunate to live together with some exceptional people in Amsterdam, a few of
which I want to mention here: Quentin, who always reminded me that a PhD is not a
sprint but a marathon; Antonin, who I have never seen in a bad mood; Natalie, who is so
convincing at roommate interviews that she left ours with a key to the flat; Sjoerd, who
knows the meanest drinking games and how to win them; Jean, who studies the brain
and has grand plans for an on/off-switch for feeling hungry or tired; and Alessandro, who
has so much overlap of interest with me that I suspect he might be a paid actor.
I also want to thank some of the people I already knew when I came to Amsterdam.
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This includes my oldest friends from Düsseldorf: Alex and Arne, who know the hardships
of doing a PhD first-hand and are always up for an adventurous trip; and Michail and Max,
both with whom it is a delight to fall back into old habits. I also made lasting friendships
during my studies in Bayreuth, particularly with Corinna, Tilman, and Harald, who all
have made me a more reflected person and who always know when to add a healthy
amount of absurdity to a conversation. I am extremely grateful to Sylvia, my former
nanny and honorary family member. Until today I can be sure of her warmth and trust,
and I strongly believe that without her I would have turned out a more boring person.
Lastly, and most importantly, I thank my parents. Their unconditional love and
unwavering belief in me have proven the strongest support imaginable. They taught
me early on that most anything can be accomplished with patience and perseverance—
especially to my mother the phrase ‘giving up’ is entirely alien—virtues which certainly
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I miss the long conversations with him about life, love, and everything else. He did not
live to see the end of my PhD, but it is safe to say that at my defense he would have been




In recent times, it has become conventional wisdom that randomized controlled trials
(RCTs) are the gold standard for causal inference. RCTs are no longer reserved to the
exact sciences but have found their way into economics, political science, sociology, and
psychology. In development economics, field experiments have led to better understand-
ing of such diverse topics as microcredit provision, deworming programs, teacher salaries,
and cash transfer programs, to name just a few. The 2019 Nobel prize awarded to Abhijit
Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Michael Kremer “for their experimental approach to allevi-
ating global poverty” further exemplifies the trend. These successes notwithstanding, for
many questions RCTs are infeasible due to financial, political, ethical, or technical con-
straints. This is where empirical microeconomics comes in. The field provides a collection
of methods that emulate experimental conditions and are tailored for causal inference
from observational data.
This dissertation consists of three independent studies in empirical development eco-
nomics. They are connected in that they all try to answer questions that could not be
tackled using experiments alone. At the same time, they make use of the experimental
methodology as the guiding principle, and in some cases, of actual data from field exper-
iments. In this introduction, I will briefly motivate and summarize the chapters. I will
also illustrate for each study why it did not lend itself to experimentation, and touch on
the respective econometric methods chosen for identification.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 is motivated, in part, by a personal anecdote. When I was in elementary school,
perhaps at the age of 8, my enthusiasm for literature was lukewarm at best. My mother,
being concerned with a potentially missed chance, decided to top up my pocket money for
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every book I finished. Surely enough, this trick turned me into an avid reader. The effect
lasted for perhaps a year, until it was decided—possibly after seeing the bewilderment of
other parents with the practice—that I had grown out of needing such mundane incentives.
This immediately turned me alliterate again. After all, I reasoned, what was the point of
reading without payment? I sometimes wonder whether the temporary incentive scheme
may have caused me to read even less overall in the years to come.
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, where poor households receive benefits
conditional on their children going to school, have some things in common with my
mother’s incentive scheme. CCTs tend to work well at achieving their primary goal
(more children going to school). The rationale for conditionality is to nudge students (or
their parents) towards behavior that is ultimately beneficial to them. But while being
successful while they last, it is unclear what their aftereffects are if they are terminated
prematurely, i.e., before the end of a student’s potential school career. To follow up on this
question, I look at data from Progresa, a Mexican CCT, in which education payments
ended after the end of middle school.
I find that the transition probability to high school is in fact negatively impacted by
the program. After ruling out competing explanations, I conclude that there are two likely
reasons. First, the program could crowd out students’ or parents’ intrinsic motivation for
seeking education. The payments thus turn going to school into a job, and once they stop
there are no sufficient reasons left to continue. Second, the program may have anchored
the perceived value of education to the payments. Them going to zero may be mistaken
for a signal that school is simply not worth it after that point—if even the government is
not willing to fund it further. I also find that the effect reverses for those students who
have not been eligible to the program on grounds of not being counted as poor. They
are more likely to pursue continued schooling if their peers received cash while going to
middle school. It appears that Progresa encouraged students from non-poor families
to use high school education to distinguish themselves from their disadvantaged peers.
The chapter is based on data from a large field experiment. However, the impact of
Progresa on the conditional high school transition probability cannot be determined
just based on a means comparison of middle school graduates from treatment and control
villages. The reason is that the program itself almost certainly had an impact on the
likelihood of completing middle school. Some middle school graduates in the treatment
villages may indeed only have finished middle school because of the program. One might
suspect that those students would have been less likely to go to high school than their
peers for whom the monetary incentives were not decisive. In fact, for the conditional
aftereffects of such an RCT, an ideal experiment does not exist, because the transition
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probability of those leaving the sample is unobserved. To tackle this problem, I deploy
a newly developed, semi-parametric identification method called double machine learning
(Chernozhukov et al., 2018). It allows me to account for a very large number of pre-
treatment variables, to balance the sample and thus overcome selection and attrition
bias.
Progresa itself was deemed largely a success by academics and policy makers alike.
It got scaled up and reintroduced under different names two times in Mexico (first as
Oportunidades, then as Prospera), and was copied by many other countries. It thus
came as a surprise to many when in early 2019 it was announced that Prospera was
going to get canceled. The program had lost popular approval for several reasons, one
of which may have been that it did a bad job of identifying poor households (Kidd and
Athias, 2020). This highlights the importance of good targeting and how it affects public
endorsement of social security programs, which is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 is on poverty targeting. Its starting point is again an existing field experiment,
conducted in Indonesia by Alatas et al. (2012). It compares three different targeting
methods to determine the beneficiaries of a one-time lump sum payment: a proxy means
test (PMT), where household consumption is predicted based on household characteristics
from a survey; a participatory wealth ranking (PWR), where representatives of each
community rank households by their need for inclusion; and a hybrid method of the first
two. The PWRs led to higher satisfaction than the other treatments and showed no
evidence of favoring local elites or discriminating against minorities. But the authors also
notice there are systematic differences between the PMT rankings and the PWRs, and
that the outcomes of the PMT treatment (unsurprisingly) led to better targeting, when
considering true household consumption as the targeting goal. I believe these findings
make for a natural follow-up question: why use consumption as the benchmark measure
to evaluate targeting effectiveness, and not a measure based on PWRs, that would much
more reflects villagers’ perceptions of poverty?
My first contribution for the chapter is to demonstrate how to construct such a mea-
sure, using the data collected by Alatas et al. (2012). The idea is to estimate the rela-
tionship of ranks from the PWR with various household welfare predictors. The resulting
model can then be used to construct welfare scores for all households from the experi-
ment, even those that were not in the communities that conducted PWRs. The scores
define a welfare measure that makes inter-village comparisons possible—even though it is
based on within-village rankings. It constitutes an alternative to per capita consumption
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as targeting goal, and it can be used to quantify targeting effectiveness of various (actual
and hypothetical) allocations.
Equipped with this new welfare measure, I explore the effects of using it as targeting
benchmark on program satisfaction. I find that added precision in meeting the newly
defined targeting goals does increase satisfaction. I do not find evidence that the partici-
patory process itself makes people happier, after controlling for targeting accuracy. And
lastly, it appears that targeting accuracy explains satisfaction outcomes better when it is
based on the community rankings rather than consumption. With these insights, I argue
that a PWR-based welfare score may be preferable to predicted consumption as targeting
measure. This may be particularly useful in settings were conducting large-scale PWRs
is not feasible or desirable. It is worth noting that when evaluating targeting methods,
one can compute measures of their effectiveness against a targeting goal. But to assess
targeting goals themselves, a separate independent yardstick is needed. This is a role that
satisfaction fulfills nicely, in addition to being of inherent interest.
In distinction to chapter 2, there is an ideal experiment to answer the main questions
here. One could simply add another treatment group to the existing trial, where the
allocation of benefits follows PWR scores. But the questions of whether PWR scores are
preferred to PMT scores and whether the ranking process matters at all for satisfaction
can just as well be answered utilizing the existing setup. The chapter thus demonstrates
a case where conducting or expanding on a costly experiment can be substituted with
careful analysis.
Large-scale antipoverty programs such as the ones mentioned in chapters 2 and 3
typically require a certain stage of development to be effective. Besides a sufficient tax
base and local government institutions, an important precondition is a functioning traffic
infrastructure. Households cannot reliably receive or collect benefits if they cannot be
reached via roads that are accessible all year round. Conditionalities for CCT programs,
such as school attendance or health checks, cannot be fulfilled if schools and medical
centers are simply out of reach. The last part of my thesis is set in rural Papua New Guinea
(PNG)—a country where up until today only about two thirds of the rural population
live within 2km of an all-season road (Slattery, Dornan and Lee, 2018).
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 is joint work with Eric Koomen, Menno Pradhan, and Christopher Edmonds.
In it, we study the role of road quality for the well-being of PNG’s rural population. The
positive impacts of roads on household consumption have already been demonstrated
in numerous publications, including for PNG (Gibson and Rozelle, 2003). The chapter
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expands on this by looking at distributional effects of roads. We are particularly interested
to see whether better roads favor disadvantaged households relatively more or less. We
also look at development outcomes on which roads have less obvious effects, such as formal
employment and school enrollment.
We combine two rounds of geocoded household survey data from 1996 and from
2009/10, respectively, with corresponding road asset management data of the same time
(which we obtained on the ground in PNG). Measuring the impact of roads is compli-
cated, since in principle every stretch of a country’s traffic network may be used by any
household, with varying frequency. The heuristic we chose is to consider the surface type
composition of the road connecting each household to the closest urban area, starting at
the road segment closest to the household. Connections to towns are arguably the most
important ones, enabling access to markets and most public services. The differences
between sealed, gravel, and dirt roads are an important consideration given the relatively
high rate of deterioration for sealed roads and the tradeoffs between road construction,
upgrading, and maintenance resulting from constrained budgets for road works. We find
that sealing roads leads to higher average consumption, housing quality, school enroll-
ment, and reduces reliance on subsistence farming. Impacts seem to be higher for poor
and remote households, indicating that road works can be considered pro-poor policy
measures.
Roads do not get upgraded at random. Instead, factors like expected cost and eco-
nomic gains as well as regional prosperity, governance, and geospatial conditions may
all codetermine which roads become graveled, asphalted, or are being left to deteriorate.
At the same time, the subject of roads does not lend itself to experimentation. A hy-
pothetical RCT to test the impact of different surface types would always suffer from
non-exclusivity of road use. Even disregarding this, it is hard to imagine that the politi-
cal and economic cost of randomly sealing roads for an RCT would ever be justified, nor
would the expectable insights reflect actual road policy. Nonetheless, the identification
strategy in this chapter is guided by the principles of randomization and control. We
estimate a correlated random effects model, making use of the repeated observations for
the same routes, and thus effectively controlling for time-invariant factors. In addition,
we control for regional trends and some carefully selected time-varying factors. The re-
maining correlation between road quality and outcomes can thus be treated as a causal
relationship.
Our results show that upgrading the roads leading to the nearest town increases aver-
age household consumption, housing quality, and school enrollment, and reduces reliance
on subsistence farming. An analysis by subgroups shows that the effects on consumption
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and poverty are at least twice as high for households with a road distance of at least 30 km
to the nearest town when comparing them to those living closer than 30 km. Furthermore,
we apply a newly developed generalized quantile regression estimator (Powell, 2020) to
look for effect heterogeneity along the distribution of consumption. The estimates suggest
that upgrading dirt roads has a higher effect for the poorest households.
Chapter 2
Do Early-ending Conditional Cash
Transfer Programs Discourage
Continued School Enrollment?
Around 20 years after their first appearance, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs for
education—initiatives that provide financial incentives for poor households to send their
children to school—have never been more popular. Praised for their potential to increase
school enrollment while reducing poverty, they are now widespread in Latin America and
gain quick traction in Africa and Asia. However, many programs do not cover the entirety
of a student’s schooldays and instead stop with welfare payments after elementary school
or middle school. Even the largest and most well-known CCT programs only started to
cover high school students long after their introduction.1
In this chapter, I investigate how CCT programs can affect school enrollment after
payments break off, using Mexico’s Progresa as a case study. The goal is to find
out whether temporary financial incentives lead to a sustained increase in educational
participation, or whether they have no or even negative effects on schooling after payments
end. Progresa is particularly well suited for this research due to its program design
in the first five years, since students were only covered until the end of middle school
(approximately at age 15). The program was also accompanied by rigorous data collection
for evaluation, and experimental conditions were created by the deference of the program
1This includes some of the largest CCTs at the time of writing (in terms of beneficiaries), namely
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, the Philippines’ Pantawid, and Colombia’s Familias en Acción, as well
as Mexico’s recently terminated Prospera (formerly known as Progresa). Further examples of
currently running CCTs that do not cover high school are Indonesia’s Program Keluarga Hara-
pan, Ghana’s Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty program, Pakistan’s Punjab Female
School Stipend Programme, Nigeria’s National Cash Transfer Programme, and Burkina
Faso’s Nahouri Cash Transfers Pilot Project.
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in some randomly chosen localities that would serve as the control group. These features
make it possible to estimate the effect of Progresa on high school enrollment.
There is an extensive literature on the short and medium term effects of cash transfers
on education outcomes, showing that CCT programs increase school enrollment while
payments are in place and lead to more years of schooling overall (see review by Bastagli
et al. 2016). However, to my knowledge there is no study on what a CCT program does
to a student’s likelihood to continue school once it is over.2 The direction of these effects
is not obvious: on the one hand, one might argue that earlier transfers free up resources,
rendering continued schooling more likely. On the other hand, a number of theories
from psychology and behavioral economics, such as loss aversion, motivation crowding,
anchoring, and classroom peer effects, could explain why the probability to continue
school might actually decrease due to earlier payments. Studying the aftereffects of CCT
programs can thus shed some light on the interaction of financial incentives and the social
norms and behavioral patterns that influence educational choice. In addition, the study is
necessary to understand a CCT’s full impact on the education distribution, and is highly
relevant for the design of future programs: a policy maker with limited funds needs to
worry less about early break-offs if CCT programs continue to have a positive effect on
enrollment. If, on the other hand, it turns out that such programs actively discourage
students from continued education, they may pose a trade-off between different levels of
secondary education, and raise the question how such discouragement may be averted.
The effect of Progresa on high school enrollment can be expressed in two different
quantities. The first one is an unconditional treatment effect. It measures the difference in
probability of high school enrollment between treatment and control group, considering
all adolescents from poor households who had finished primary school just before the
program started (around the age of 12). The resulting number is easy to interpret, but is
likely driven by the program impact on middle school enrollment. The second quantity
is a conditional treatment effect, i.e., the effect on the probability to make the transition
from middle school to high school. It is a more direct measure of program aftereffects,
and thus receives the main focus of this chapter. The estimation is complicated by the
fact that the education payments have likely changed the composition of middle school
graduates between the treatment and control group after two years: presumably, some
of the students in the treatment group would not have finished middle school in the
2A related problem is tackled by Buser et al. (2017), who study the impacts on child health of
households dropping out of an unconditional cash transfer program in Ecuador, finding negative effects
on weight and height. The methodological difference to my question is that I do not focus on the effect
of Progresa ending (comparing those who lost eligibility with those who maintained it), but on its
aftereffects (comparing participants after the end of the treatment with non-participants).
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absence of payments. Consequently, these students have relatively fewer counterparts in
the control group. To account for this, observations need to be weighted by the students’
likelihood to graduate from middle school without the program, or equivalently, their
likelihood to be in the treatment group given that they graduated from middle school.
The main result of the chapter is that having been paid for schooling in the past
reduces the probability to continue once the payments stop by about 10 to 14 percentage
points. It appears that making payments up to a point actively discourages students to
stay in school afterwards. After testing and ruling out loss aversion and classroom peer
effects as explanations, I conclude that this is likely caused by a shift in the perceived
value of education. The negative effect does not spill over to adolescents from non-poor
households in treatment locations, who were not eligible for the program. To the contrary,
for these adolescents the program even had a positive high school enrollment effect, with
an increase in high school graduation of between 15 and 19 percentage points. The
program seems to raise the desire of non-poor students to distinguish themselves through
more schooling.
The chapter’s other contribution beside these findings is in demonstrating a way to es-
timate program aftereffects conditional on a composition change induced by the program
itself. Despite the randomization of Progresa communities, the program payments can
be expected to have led to differences in the distributions of middle school graduates be-
tween treatment and control group. It is worth noting that this imbalance is an inherent
property of the evaluation of conditional aftereffects. There is no ideal experiment that
might serve as a benchmark. Nonetheless, aftereffects can be relevant in various con-
texts, e.g. when studying withdrawal in medical trials or job search after a time-limited
unemployment benefit program ends. The approach taken in this chapter is to make an
assumption of unconfounded treatment, conditional on a large number of baseline charac-
teristics. This is not done to correct for selection into treatment and control group (which
is random), but for the decision to drop out as a result of group membership.
To obtain causal estimates, I employ a newly developed procedure to estimate treat-
ment effects, called double machine learning (DML), by Victor Chernozhukov, Denis
Chetverikov, Mert Demirer, Esther Duflo, Christian Hansen, Whitney Newey and James
Robins (2018). It is a doubly-robust estimation technique (see e.g. Bang and Robins
2005), i.e., it makes use of predictions of both propensity scores and outcomes, and is ro-
bust to misspecifications of either one of these. A variety of machine learning methods as
well as sample-splitting are used to learn and predict the relationships of treatment status
and outcomes with potential confounders. DML permits to capture complex functional
relationships and to control for large sets of covariates—possibly containing more elements
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than there are observations—without having to know either in advance. This approach
relies on fewer assumptions than conventional propensity score methods, and makes re-
sults more credible in comparison. Beside correcting for selection bias, the method can be
extended to correct for imbalances resulting from attrition as well. I develop the extension
of the DML method in this chapter, using the assumption that missingness of outcomes
is random conditional on observables.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2.1, I summarize the related literature and
offer a number of explanations for aftereffects of CCT programs on school enrollment.
Section 2.2 sums up the relevant details about the program and the data used. In section
2.3, I explain the identification strategy. Section 2.4 contains details about the estima-
tion procedure including the machine learning methods used, together with results. The
findings are further expanded on in section 2.5, with an analysis of possible channels and
a discussion of covariate stability. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.1 Literature and Potential Mechanisms
This chapter contributes to the literature on CCTs and school enrollment. For Progresa,
it has been shown that adolescents of treatment families stay in school with higher prob-
ability than those in the control group, and that this effect is particularly pronounced
for those in the age for middle school (Schultz 2004, Behrman, Sengupta and Todd 2005,
and Behrman, Parker and Todd 2009). Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Attanasio, Meghir
and Santiago (2012) evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative program specifications
to the ones of Progresa using structural models of decision making. Both studies con-
clude that a shift of program resources from primary school age children to middle school
age adolescents would have led to a higher increase of total completed years of school-
ing. Perhaps closest to this chapter, Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2005) and Dubois,
de Janvry and Sadoulet (2012) estimate transition probabilities of Progresa students
from one grade to another. The study by Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2005) is the only
one that considers the probability to go to high school, however without controlling for
compositional changes as a result of prior program exposure, and only for small subsets
of the data. Dubois, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2012) aim to disentangle the effects of
Progresa on grade repetition and continuation. They circumvent the selection problem
by looking only at the first year of implementation, and find among other things that
middle school students in the treatment group are more likely to repeat a grade. The
authors speculate that this may reflect the incentive to stay in middle school longer due
to the limited program coverage.
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To my knowledge, no study so far has concentrated on the schooling impacts of Pro-
gresa—or any other CCT program—after payments stop. On the face of it, it may not
be obvious why the decision to continue school should depend on having been paid to go
to school before. In the remainder of this section, I offer a number of explanations of how
this may come about, each one supported by theoretical or empirical literature.
Easing financial constraints: One of the goals of CCT programs is helping poor house-
holds to finance children’s education. If financial constraints are in fact the main driver
of educational underinvestment, then easing these constraints by making cash payments
should result in more schooling. For instance, a family may have saved just enough to
allow their child to finish middle school. Giving transfer payments until that point may
then enable the household to save more, which in turn might allow the child to go to high
school. The study by de Janvry et al. (2006) supports the argument that CCT payments
can help smoothing out spending on education. It finds that Progresa takes a safety
net function, in that it protects children from the impacts of shocks on school enrollment.
The smoothing of education spending may not only work intertemporally within house-
holds, but also between households. Angelucci et al. (2010) show that Progresa raises
middle school enrollment only for children with large family networks, in which transfer
payments go from better-off to worse-off family members to ensure their children’s school
enrollment.
While CCT programs allow to save more money for future education and thus might
facilitate high school enrollment, a number of insights from psychology and behavioral
economics point in the opposite direction. In the following, I highlight four reasons why
CCT programs could discourage further schooling after they end: loss aversion, motivation
crowding, anchoring, and classroom peer effects.
Loss aversion: Loss aversion is a central feature of prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1991). It means that relative to a psychological
point of reference, losses loom larger than gains of equal size. For intertemporal choice
problems, this means that people require a larger payment to postpone present consump-
tion than the amount they are willing to pay to have future consumption now (Loewenstein
1988). In the context of CCT programs, the choice between working (more consumption
now) and continuing school (more consumption later) may depend on whether going to
school is framed as a loss or a forgone gain of current consumption. Since reference points
are often derived from past levels of consumption, families who have received Progresa
payments may frame the choice as having either less or the same current consumption as
before. On the other hand, families who never received Progresa payments may per-
ceive the choice as having either the same or higher levels of consumption, making them
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more likely to choose more education. An early study documenting similar behavior is
Weiss, Hall and Dong (1980), on the effect of the Seattle-Denver income maintenance
experiment on education. The authors find that reducing the (relatively low) direct costs
of schooling, by offering subsidies on schooling expenditure, led to a large increase in
enrollment among young adults. At the same time, significantly reducing the opportunity
cost of going to school, by increasing the income tax rate for low incomes, had no such
effect. This finding is consistent with loss aversion, if the direct costs are perceived as
losses while the opportunity costs are viewed as foregone gains (Thaler 1980).
Motivation crowding: Another relevant theory from behavioral economics is motiva-
tion crowding theory (Frey and Jegen 2001, Fehr and Falk 2002). It acknowledges that
people’s actions are often motivated by hope for social approval, a desire to be moral, or
intrinsic interest. When monetary incentives are added, they can replace those motives.
A famous example is given by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), who show that introducing
a fine for parents who are late to fetch their children from kindergarten makes them arrive
even later. The explanation is that being late, which used to be the violation of an ethical
norm before, is being reframed into a good that can be bought for a reasonable price.
Importantly, removing the fine did not make the parents arrive earlier again. In the same
way, Progresa may put a price tag on the moral obligation to let children go to school.
In distinction to the experiment by Gneezy and Rustichini, the price of non-conformance
is high enough to comply with the program. But quantifying the value of sending chil-
dren to school may reduce the pressure to let them continue after the payments stop. The
crowding out effect may also spill over from parents to students, who might view school as
necessary labor rather than an opportunity to learn. The negative effect tangible rewards
can have on students’ intrinsic motivation to learn has been demonstrated in a number
of psychological studies (see Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999 for a meta-analysis).
Anchoring: If financial constraints were in fact the only reason for educational under-
investment, there would be no reason to make transfer payments conditional on school
attendance. Instead, an unconditional cash transfer could achieve the same result with-
out the need to monitor compliance, and freed from the often raised criticism that CCT
programs are paternalistic. One reason for conditionality is that children as well as par-
ents may be poorly informed about the returns to education, or about the natural talent
required to complete school (Fiszbein and Schady 2010). For instance, Nguyen (2008)
shows that households in Madagascar lack information about returns to education but
change decisions rationally when this information is updated. Jensen (2010) shows that
eight-graders in the Dominican Republic massively underestimate the rate of return to
secondary school. And Dizon-Ross (2018) finds that parents in Malawi hold inaccurate
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beliefs about their children’s ability, the more so when they have low education them-
selves, and that they misallocate resources to education accordingly. In this light, making
cash transfer programs conditional is a way to nudge students into a higher level of educa-
tional attainment, thus overcoming not only financial obstacles but also bad decisions due
to incomplete information. But in doing so, CCT programs also convey a signal about
the value of education: if the government is willing to pay for it, it must be worth pursu-
ing. Conversely, the drop in payments after middle school may suggest that subsidizing
poor students to go to high school is not worth it—be it due to low marginal returns
to schooling at this level, or because students from poor families are deemed unlikely to
succeed there. This particular form of priming effect where a numerical reference point
(the program payout) affects the assessment of an unknown value (the value of going to
high school) is called anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). By first anchoring the
value of schooling to the Progresa payouts and then reducing it to zero, the government
could unintentionally make further education appear less desirable.
Classroom peer effects: If a CCT program works as intended, some students keep
attending school who would not have done so in the absence of the program. Presumably,
this leads to larger class sizes and a higher share of disadvantaged students, which may
affect motivation and learning of the students who would have gone to school without
the program. For instance, the literature on classroom peer effects suggests that higher
shares of disadvantaged students lead to more misbehavior in class, lower teaching quality,
and negative performance spillovers (e.g. Carrell and Hoekstra 2010, Lavy, Paserman
and Schlosser 2012). Thus, by the end of middle school, some students may have lost
their motivation or aptitude to continue with high school. However, the changes in the
composition of students may well have heterogeneous effects on students with different
background or ability, and may even increase motivation for some students (say, through
increased competition for grades or out of a need to distinguish themselves from the
disadvantaged students). Thus, classroom peer effects may affect high school enrollment
in both directions.
All these channels are possible explanations of direct program effects. Most CCT
programs only target the poorest households, but they may affect students from other
households nonetheless. For the case of Progresa, such spillover effects have been doc-
umented: Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) argue that due to inter-household risk-sharing,
food consumption increases even for non-eligible households in Progresa treatment vil-
lages. And Attanasio, Meghir and Santiago (2012) find, for their sample of boys between
10 and 16, that school enrollment was substantially higher for the non-eligible adolescents
in the treatment group than for those in the control group. If households within a village
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share program resources, one would expect that spillover effects on high school enroll-
ment take the same direction as for the eligible students. If enrollment rises as a result of
increased savings, this effect might well spread across household networks to non-eligible
students. Social norm changes, value signals, and classroom composition changes may
affect non-eligible students differently than eligible ones. If any of these channels are
among the main drivers for direct effects, the direction of spillover effects is a priori hard
to predict.
2.2 Program and Data Description
The Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación, short: Progresa, was a
multi-component antipoverty program launched in 1997. Its original goal was to improve
prior antipoverty programs in Mexico along a number of dimensions, such as increasing
targeting efficiency and reducing administrative costs (Gantner 2009). At first, a limited
number of rural localities were selected for inclusion. Localities had to have between 50
and 2,500 inhabitants, access to health and education services, and had to be considered
highly deprived based on available census data. Households from the selected localities
were then classified as poor or not poor based on baseline survey data. Only households
classified as poor were eligible.
One declared target was to increase school attendance of adolescents from poor fam-
ilies. The education component of Progresa included cash transfers every two months
to mothers of every child enrolled in grades 3 to 9 who attended at least 85 percent of
classes. This includes the last four years of primary school (primaria) and all of middle
school (secondaria) but not high school (preparatoria or bachillerato). Payments increased
with the age of the child to adjust to the increasing opportunity costs of schooling due
to higher child wages. However, according to Schultz (2004), these payments were still
lower than the average value of full-time child labor. In 2001, the program was renamed
Oportunidades and extended to urban areas, and the schooling grants were extended
to include the high school level.
For evaluation purposes, localities were randomized into a treatment and a control
group. Payments for eligible households in the treatment group started in May 1998,
while payments for eligible households in the control group only started in December
1999. The evaluation sample includes 320 treatment localities and 186 control localities.
Survey data was collected twice a year for all households of the evaluation set from 1997
to 2000. Two surveys were administered before the program started in the treatment
group (in October 1997 and March 1998), three between the start of the program for the
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treatment and the control group (in October 1998, May 1999, and November 1999), and
three after the program had started for the control group (in May 2000, November 2000,
and winter 2003). The surveys contain detailed information on each household, including
demographics, expenditure, schooling and labor outcomes, attitudes toward education,
and location characteristics.
To identify the effect that Progresa had on the transition to high school, I consider
the cohort of students who could have started high school in the academic year of 2000/01.
By the end of the term in July 2000, the eligible students in the treatment group had
benefited from Progresa for more than two years. Those in the control group had only
been exposed to the program for the last semester of middle school, when the decision to
continue school afterwards had likely been made already.3 Figure 2.2.1 depicts a timeline
with all survey dates. The two arrows indicate how long the students from the cohort
under discussion were exposed to the program, for the treatment and the control group,
respectively.
I consider three outcome variables related to high school attendance. The first is
whether the student went to high school at the time of the November 2000 survey, i.e.,
right after finishing middle school. The second variable is whether the student had ever
been to high school by the time of the 2003 survey. The third variable is whether the
student had completed high school in 2003 or was enrolled in the last grade, thus would
supposedly have graduated by 2004. The last two variables are particularly useful to
check the medium-term impact on high school enrollment. After all, it could be that
any differences in high school enrollment at the end of middle school fade out after a
while. This may happen, for instance, if parents and students do eventually overcome any
behavioral biases induced by the program and start realizing their full education potential.
Or it might be that those in the treatment group had actually formed expectations about
a future inclusion of high school students in the program and thus simply postponed
enrollment by a little.4
3One could also consider the students who were expected to start high school in the academic year
1999/2000. In July 2000, the eligible students in the treatment group of this older cohort had been
exposed to the program for one year, and the students in the control group not at all. Unfortunately,
however, for this cohort it is not possible to unambiguously determine the set of students having finished
middle school in 1999, and whether these students continued to high school afterwards. This is due to the
fact that some of the relevant questions do not appear in the corresponding survey rounds. Therefore, I
do not consider this cohort.
4While this cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely. The program itself had initially only been promised
for three years, and its continuation after the general election in 2000 was uncertain. The decisions to
continue and eventually extend the program to include high school students in 2001 were only made after
an evaluation of Progresa by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), based on the
first few years of running the program (Schultz 2004, Skoufias 2005). Thus, given the information at the
time, it would have been an unlikely bet for students to delay high school in hopes of its later inclusion.
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In addition to high school outcomes I also consider two outcome variables related to
middle school completion: whether a student graduated from middle school in academic
year 1999/2000, and whether a student either graduated or was in the second last grade of
middle school in academic year 1999/2000, thus would likely have graduated by 2001. The
latter variable accounts for students who had a gap between primary and middle school,
or who—voluntarily or not—repeated a grade in middle school. While these outcomes
are not the main focus of this chapter, they serve as a way to verify prior results on the
effectiveness of Progresa, and help to put the findings on high school enrollment into
perspective. It is worth emphasizing that the average treatment effects on middle school
completion and high school enrollment do not allow to make inferences on the average
transition probability for middle school graduates, given the potential effect heterogeneity
and differences between treatment and control group students at the end of middle school.
Tables 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 show descriptive statistics by eligibility status as well as treat-
ment and control group. Table 2.2.1 summarizes the sample of all adolescents who had
graduated from primary school in 1997 and who were between 11 and 14 years old at
that time.5 Thus, assuming a regular school career, these students could have started
high school in 2000. I refer to this sample of students as the unconditional sample. Table
2.2.2 summarizes those adolescents of the same birth cohorts who finished the last year of
middle school in 2000. I refer to this sample of students as the conditional sample, since
it will be used to compute program treatment effects conditional on having graduated
from middle school. Middle school completion is not included as a question in any of the
questionnaires, but it can be constructed by taking all adolescents who reported the last
year of middle school as their highest completed grade in the November 2000 survey, and
who also reported being enrolled in school both in the November 1999 survey and in the
May 2000 survey. There are two small caveats with this. First, the conditions do not rule
out students who actually graduated from middle school before 2000 and then, in school
year 1999/2000, attempted another grade of further education, which was not completed
or simply not reported. Second, Progresa may have led some of the treated students to
repeat the last grade on purpose to remain eligible to the program (see Dubois, de Jan-
vry and Sadoulet 2012), and while it may not be wrong to include these students, it is
conceivable that they influence the results significantly. So to exclude such cases, a fur-
ther restriction is to consider only those students who reported the second year of middle
5The variable “had graduated from primary school in 1997” is in fact being constructed from multiple
survey questions. The age restriction is being used as an additional fail safe against including people who
completed primary school long before 1997. The interval 11 to 14 years is chosen to include students who
started school at the regular age and repeated up to two grades. All the calculations in this chapter were
also done for adolescents between 11 and 16 years as a robustness check. The results do not qualitatively
differ from the ones presented in this chapter. They are available on request.
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school as their highest completed grade in the November 1999 survey. This restricted
sample is defined more concisely, but comes at the cost of a loss of potentially relevant
observations. Adolescents from eligible (poor) and ineligible (non-poor) households are
regarded separately. The estimations of treatment effects are conducted for each of these
two groups, to obtain direct program effects and spillover effects, respectively. The tables
also report the share of missing observations (NA) for each variable and experimental
group.6
The descriptive statistics indicate that adolescents from eligible households in the
treatment group went to high school with lower probability than those in the control group,
both in the unconditional sample and the conditional samples. These differences cannot
be interpreted as causal effects. It is to be expected that the composition of students
who finish middle school differs between treatment and control group, and that missing
outcomes are not missing completely at random. I construct a large number of exogenous
characteristics to balance the two groups. They originate from the two pre-treatment
surveys, and include such things as demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of
the household, parents’ level of education, parents’ assessment of the student’s ability
and expectations about future educational outcomes, parents’ assessment of teacher and
school quality, village characteristics, average local education level, and travel times to
a number of educational institutions. Using high-dimensional econometric techniques
allows me to include a large number of potentially relevant characteristics without having
to know in advance which of them are actually correlated with treatment status, high
school enrollment, and outcomes missing. A list of all the considered characteristics is
included in section 2.A.1 of the appendix.
2.3 Identification Strategy
The identification strategy is laid out here with the estimation of direct treatment effects
in mind—with adolescents from eligible households as the population—but it works iden-
tically for the estimation of spillover effects. The problem of sample attrition is ignored
for now, but is being discussed further below. For each of N students, let W = (Y,D,X),
where D is an indicator variable for living in a treatment locality and Y an outcome
variable, e.g. an indicator for going to high school. Y (1) and Y (0) denote potential out-
6Missing outcomes are mostly a result of sample attrition. The panel also contains a few observations
with inconsistent characteristics. These inconsistencies include a sex change, age discrepancies, and
diminishing highest school degree. Those observations with inconsistencies between the pre-treatment
surveys are dropped. Those with discrepancies only in one of the later surveys are deemed reliable with
respect to their pre-treatment characteristics and only have outcomes set to missing.
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comes, so that Y = DY (1) + (1−D)Y (0). X is a p-dimensional vector of exogenous
control variables. All expectations are taken over the distribution of W .
In what follows, I distinguish between unconditional and conditional treatment effects,
by which I mean the treatment effects for the correspondent samples, respectively. For
the unconditional sample, the statistic of interest is the average treatment effect (ATE),
ATE = E [Y (1)− Y (0)] . (2.3.1)
For the conditional sample, the focus lies on those students who would have finished
middle school even without Progresa. This is because the program itself has likely
added some students to the pool of middle school graduates in the treatment group.
These students do not have a counterpart in the control group, so that for them the
treatment effect is not identifiable. On the other hand, it is inconceivable that a student
who finishes middle school in the absence of payments would not have done so in their
presence. To use the parlance of the literature on local average treatment effects: the
analysis is concentrated on the always-takers, who by virtue of the experimental setup
should be fully represented in both groups. It aims to leave out the compliers, as their
counterfactual is not observed, as well as the defiers, who are nonexistent by assumption.
One way to eliminate the compliers and defiers from the sample is to use a trimming
technique (Imbens and Rubin, 2015), dropping students with no overlap in the distribution
of covariates or propensity scores. This should eliminate both compliers and defiers from
the sample for the ATE. Another way to exclude the compliers is to consider the average
treatment effect of the non-treated (ATN),
ATN = E [Y (1)− Y (0) |D = 0] , (2.3.2)
which is based on the distribution of students in the control group. As I am interested
in the entire distribution of treatment and control group, the discussion focuses on the
ATE. I do, however, compute estimates of both the ATE and the ATN and find that they
are very close and statistically indistinguishable in all cases.
If the students under consideration were sampled into treatment and control group
at random and if missing outcomes were missing completely at random, the ATE would
simply be identified by the difference in sample means between treatment and control
group, or average predictive effect (APE),
APE = E [Y |D = 1]− E [Y |D = 0] . (2.3.3)
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The APEs of the program are in fact equivalent to the differences in means (∆) in Tables
2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
There are two reasons why the APE may not be an unbiased estimator of the ATE,
despite the initial randomization of households. The first reason is sample selection, a
concern only for the conditional sample: it may be that some students in the treatment
group only finished middle school because of Progresa. These students would be com-
paratively less likely to continue to high school, and thus create the false impression that
the program has a (more) negative effect on high school enrollment.
The second reason for possible bias is attrition. In the unconditional sample, around
33% of the adolescents identified in the two pre-treatment surveys have missing outcomes
from the November 2000 survey, and around 45% of them have missing outcomes from
the 2003 survey. In the unrestricted conditional sample, around 16% of the adolescents
have missing outcomes from the 2003 survey. Attrition becomes a problem when it does
not occur completely at random. For instance, it is conceivable that independently of
their treatment status, the students who do not go to high school are more likely to drop
out of the sample. Considering only those who stay would then lead the estimate of the
ATE to be biased towards 0.
Sample Selection Bias
I address these two concerns separately, starting with sample selection. For the estimation
of conditional treatment effects, I rely on the assumption that treatment is independent
of outcomes conditional on pre-treatment control variables X,
Y (1) , Y (0)⊥D |X. (2.3.4)
Under this assumption, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) famously showed that it is suffi-
cient to condition on the propensity score instead of the whole vector of controls. There
are, however, some limitations commonly associated with this approach. The researcher
needs to know exactly which variables to condition on, as well as the functional form of
the probability model. Economic intuition may be helpful for model selection up to a
point. But despite best efforts, seemingly relevant features may nonetheless lead to over-
fitted propensity scores, while seemingly unrelated variables may hold a lot of predictive
power through correlations with important unobserved features. In addition, the estab-
lished methods require low model complexity for identification—i.e., p ￿ N—even in
cases where a large number of confounders is plausible. Consequently, there is little insur-
ance against misspecification of the probability model, which calls the unconfoundedness
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assumption (2.3.4) and the propensity score method into question.
For this chapter, I use the specification and estimation strategy taken in Chernozhukov
et al. (2018). To formalize the relationship between D, Y , and X, consider the model
Y = g0 (D,X) + U, E [U |D,X ] = 0, (2.3.5)
D = m0 (X) + V, E [V |X ] = 0. (2.3.6)
This specification is quite general in that it allows for heterogeneous treatment effects and
does not require D and X to be additively separable in the regression function g0 (D,X).
m0 (X) is the propensity score, i.e., the conditional probability to be in the treatment
group. The subscript 0 indicates true parameters. The ATE is given by
θ0 := E [g0 (1, X)− g0 (0, X)] , (2.3.7)
and the ATN by
γ0 := E [g0 (1, X)− g0 (0, X) |D = 0] . (2.3.8)
Belloni, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2014) and Belloni et al. (2017) point out that in a
high-dimensional parameter space, directly estimating equation (2.3.5) using sophisticated
machine learning methods is ill-advised. While doing so may result in a great fit of Y ,
this approach neglects how treatment assignment is affected by covariates, potentially
resulting in a large bias. One way to overcome this bias—and the approach taken in
this chapter—is to use machine learning in conjunction with doubly-robust estimation, or
double machine learning (Farrell 2015, Belloni et al. 2017, Chernozhukov et al. 2018).
The idea is to estimate the nuisance functions η0 = (g0 (D,X) ,m0 (X)) separately
using machine learning methods. θ0 and γ0 are then identified by plugging these estimates
into a set of orthogonal moment conditions, E [ψθ (W ; θ0, η0)] = 0 and E [ψγ (W ; γ0, η0)] =
0. The underlying score functions ψθ (W ; θ, η) and ψγ (W ; γ, η) for ATE and ATN are
explained in section 2.A.2 in the appendix. Another crucial part of the DML method is
cross-fitting, a sample-splitting technique to ensure that the same observations used to
estimate nuisance functions g0 (D,X) and m0 (X) are not also used to make predictions
thereof. This is done to prevent bias induced by overfitting, which is likely to occur
for most machine learning techniques even after careful calibration of hyperparameters.
The possibility to aggregate or choose the best out of multiple machine learning methods
guarantees estimability for a wide range of data generating processes.7 Details on the
7An alternative approach to deal with regularization bias is discussed in Athey, Imbens and Wager
(2018). It does not require estimability of the propensity score, but in turn limits the complexity of the
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cross-fitting procedure are given in section 2.A.3 of the appendix.
Attrition Bias
Having discussed how the problem of nonrandom sample selection is approached, I now
turn to nonrandom attrition. Let R be an indicator variable for attrition, taking the value
1 if Y is non-missing and 0 otherwise, and W = (Y,D,R,X). I assume that outcomes
are missing at random, meaning that attrition is independent of outcomes conditional on
treatment status D and control variables X,
Y (1) , Y (0)⊥R | (D,X). (2.3.9)
So, while attrition on its own may be predictive of outcomes, this predictive power comes
entirely from observable variables. The approach is similar to the one taken in Behrman,
Parker and Todd (2009) on the medium-term effects of Progresa, where attrition from
the 2003 survey is also assumed to be random conditional on a (small) number of ob-
servables and treatment status. I propose the following extension of the model above to
accommodate this assumption:
Y = g0 (D,X) + U, E [U |D,R,X ] = 0, (2.3.10)
D = m0 (X) + V, E [V |X ] = 0, (2.3.11)
R = r0 (D,X) + Z, E [Z |D,X ] = 0. (2.3.12)
r0 (D,X) is the conditional probability that student i’s outcome is observed. R does not
enter the regression function g0, but r0 (D,X) is needed to account for possible differences
in the distribution of (D,X) between students with observed and unobserved outcomes.
Just as for the model without attrition, ATE and ATN are identified by predicting nui-
sance functions η0 = (g0 (D,X) ,m0 (X) , r0 (D,X)) and deploying the estimates in a
corresponding orthogonal moment condition. The respective score functions are given in
section 3.A.2 of the appendix.
As long as the nuisance functions are well approximated by any of the machine learning
methods used, the resulting DML estimators θ̂0 and γ̂0 are
√
N -consistent, approximately
unbiased and asymptotically normally distributed. For the model without attrition, this
is stated in Theorem 5.1 of Chernozhukov et al. (2018). An equivalent version of this
theorem for the model with attrition is given in section 2.A.4 of the appendix of this
chapter.
regression function by assuming strong sparsity.
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2.4 Estimation
I estimate the ATE and the ATN using 10-fold cross-fitting with 100 repetitions. The
sample is being split such that all students from the same location end up in the same
fold. For the separate estimation of the nuisance functions η0, I use six different machine
learning methods. The first three machine learning techniques are regularized logistic
regression techniques, namely the Lasso (with ￿1 penalty), Ridge (with ￿2 penalty), and
elastic net (with both ￿1 and ￿2 penalty). Furthermore, I use two tree-based techniques—
namely the random forest and extreme gradient boosting—and support vector machines
(SVM).8 In addition, I include a technique that combines the best machine learning
methods for each nuisance function, i.e., the ones that produce the smallest out-of-sample
mean squared error (or: Brier score). Before the actual estimation, the hyperparameters
for each machine learning method are tuned to maximize out-of-sample predictive power.
This is done via repeated cross-validation, using 10 folds and 10 repetitions. Details
on hyperparameter tuning, data preparation for each method, and handling of missing
feature values are given in section 2.A.5 of the appendix.
To exclude extreme values for the propensity score and to guarantee overlap between
treatment and control group, I apply the trimming procedure developed in Crump et al.
(2009) and Imbens and Rubin (2015). It produces an interval (α, 1− α) such that all
observations with propensity scores outside this interval are discarded. The number of
trimmed observations varies by sample and cross fitting iteration, but it is 0 for the large
majority of iterations for each sample. The maximum fraction of discarded observations
in an iteration is 5.2% for the conditional samples and 0.3% for the unconditional sample.
For the unconditional sample, I compute the ATE for the three high school indicators
and the two middle school indicators discussed above as outcomes.9 For the conditional
sample, I compute both the ATE and ATN for the three high school indicators. For the
variance estimation of the DML estimators, it is necessary to account for clustering, since
the treatment status of the Progresa experiment does not vary within villages. Since the
number of observations per village varies substantially, cluster-robust standard errors may
not be consistent, as is argued in Mackinnon and Webb (2017). This can be overcome
by using a wild cluster bootstrap instead. I obtain standard errors in this way using
8In addition to these methods, I also considered neural networks with a single hidden layer, as well as
different ensemble learners that would combine the aforementioned methods. Both the neural network
and the ensemble methods turned out to be computationally expensive to tune, while showing relatively
poor predictive performance. For that reason, I chose to leave them out eventually.
9In fact, since the unconditional sample is randomized, it would be sufficient for an unbiased estimate
of the ATE to correct only for attrition. But accounting for covariates may increase precision even in the
absence of sample selection, particularly if treatment and control group are not completely balanced, as
is suggested by Behrman and Todd (1999) for the Progresa baseline data.
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100,000 bootstrap replications and the distribution for the bootstrap multiplier suggested
by Mammen (1993). The ATE results from combining the nuisance function estimates
of the respective best-fitting machine learning methods (i.e., my preferred specification)
are reported in Table 2.4.1. More detailed results, with estimates for each of the machine
learning methods used and including the ATN, are depicted in Tables 2.A.2 to 2.A.9 in
section 2.A.6 of the appendix.
2.5 Discussion and Possible Channels
2.5.1 Discussion of Results
I start by discussing the eligible students, since they are the main focus of this chapter.
Looking at the first column of Table 2.4.1, it appears that the program did not have a
statistically or economically significant effect on timely high school enrollment for the
eligible student population. However, it seems that by 2003, the program made it less
likely by about 8.5 percentage points for students to have enrolled in high school at some
point. Looking at the third outcome, it is unclear whether this translated into lower
high school graduation rates for treated students. It is a somewhat unexpected result
that eligible students in the treatment group who had just completed primary school
when the program started would not have higher eventual high school continuation rates.
This is especially so since Progresa seems to have had a positive effect on middle
school completion: the probability to have graduated from or to be in the last grade of
middle school in 2000 went up by about 8.8 percentage points.10 Therefore, it must be
that the program had a negative effect on the continuation decisions of middle school
graduates. This hypothesis is confirmed when looking at the second and third columns.
The ATE for high school in 2000 is -12.5 and -14.5 percentage points for the unrestricted
and restricted sample, respectively. The effect is slightly smaller when looking at high
school participation until 2003, with -10.1 and -12.6 percentage points, and at high school
graduation or near graduation by 2003, with -10.0 and -9.8 percentage points.
For the non-eligible students, the fourth column of Table 2.4.1 shows that being in the
treatment group increased high school enrollment and graduation by up to 13 percentage
points. This result is partly driven by the program’s known spillover effect of middle
10However, the effect is close to zero when only considering middle school graduation by 2000. The
difference between the effects on graduation by 2000 and 2001 could arise because some adolescents may
have enrolled in middle school in response to the program after it was launched in 1998, while the program
did not affect the completion rate of those already enrolled at that time. Another explanation is that
some students in the treatment group purposefully repeated a grade to receive payments longer, as is
conjectured by Dubois, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2012).
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school graduation on non-eligible students (Attanasio, Meghir and Santiago, 2012), which
is also confirmed here. Looking at the fifth and sixth column, it seems that it is also
driven by the program’s direct effect on middle school graduates: the ATE for all high
school outcomes is positive, and it is statistically significant for high school graduation
and (for the restricted sample) for having done some high school by 2003. This result is
unexpected, since it implies a sort of reverse spillover effect: those who saw their peers
getting paid became more likely to continue schooling, while those actually getting paid
lost interest. There are nonetheless ways to rationalize this finding. One explanation
may be that an influx of poor students in middle school increases the need of non-poor
students and their parents to distinguish themselves through further education. It is also
conceivable that seeing their peers getting paid triggers the ineligible students’ will to
demonstrate their capability despite being at a relative disadvantage. Lastly, classroom
peer effects could be responsible. An increase in eligible low ability students in middle
school as a result of the program may reduce learning outcomes for other low ability
students, while it may strengthen the relative position of high ability students (of which
many may be non-eligible) and thus heighten their self-esteem and motivation. This latter
hypothesis is, however, not supported by the data, as is shown in the following subsection.
2.5.2 Possible Channels
The precise channels for the observed treatment effects are impossible to learn with cer-
tainty from the data at hand. Nonetheless, I can examine two of the possible causes men-
tioned in section 2.1, namely classroom peer effects and loss aversion, and check whether
they constitute credible explanations for the observed effects. Starting with classroom
peer effects: if it is true that Progresa worsens the pool of middle school students, one
would expect this to show in measures of performance. Unfortunately, such measures are
not available until the 2003 survey. However, parents’ assessments are available from the
pre-treatment survey of March 1998. I consider three binary variables: whether (accord-
ing the the parents) the student is good at school, whether the student is apt enough to
go to high school or further, and whether the student is apt enough to go to university.
While these assessments are certainly very noisy signals of a student’s ability, there is no
obvious reason to believe they should not at least convey some information thereon. Table
2.5.1 shows the differences in averages of the assessment variables between the treatment
and control group, both for eligible and non-eligible students. Judging by this table, the
hypothesis that the eligible students who finished middle school in the treatment group
should on average be less apt than those in the control group is not supported. If any-
thing, the numbers suggest the opposite. Thus, the theory of negative classroom peer
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effects is not supported by the data.
Next, in order to examine loss aversion as a possible explanation, I check whether
financial concerns are responsible for the differences in high school enrollment between
treatment and control group. To that end, I look at a question asking for the reasons
why students did not go to school in the November 2000 survey. Of the possible answers
to this question, three point to financial constraints, namely: (1) there is not enough
money to send the student to school, (2) the student is needed for work, and (3) the
student is needed at home. I lump these together in an indicator variable that is 1 if
one of these three reasons were given and 0 otherwise. In the same fashion, I create
another indicator that lumps together all the other reasons why a student might not go
to high school. The most frequent reasons here include: (1) the student does not like
school, (2) the student is in vocational training11, (3) the student is already grown up,
and (4) the school is too far away. Yet another variable related to financial constraints
may be actual household expenditures. Therefore, I also construct a variable of monthly
per capita expenditure, using prices and quantities of goods as indicated in the section
on consumption and expenditure from the November 2000 survey.
I use these three variables—student does not go to high school due to financial reasons,
student does not go to high school for other than financial reasons, and monthly per capita
expenditure—as outcomes and apply the DML model on the conditional samples. This
way it should be possible to see whether or not the program effects can be explained
through intermediate effects on household finances. In particular, if loss aversion is the
main driver of the negative treatment effect for the eligible students, this might show in
a higher share of students not going to school for money reasons and higher per capita
expenditures in the treatment group. Table 2.5.2 sums up the results, with more detailed
outputs in Tables 2.A.10 to 2.A.13 in section 2.A.6 of the appendix.
The results show that not going to high school due to financial constraints as well
as expenditure seem to be nearly unaffected by the program. On the other hand, the
program does seem to disincline eligible students from high school for other than financial
reasons, whereas it has the opposite effect on non-eligible students. This result indicates
that loss aversion may not be the main explanation for the negative treatment effect
on eligible students. Instead, it seems more likely that the program impacts enrollment
through other factors such as social norms or students’ motivation.
11One could argue that vocational training is a choice that promises security and may thus be counted
as a signal for financial constraints. Only 3% of the students in the unrestricted sample had chosen this
track, and counting them to the other group does not significantly change the results.
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2.5.3 Coefficient Stability
The estimation of treatment effects using the DML method takes into account a large
number of observed characteristics, as well as unobserved characteristics that are cor-
related with any combination of the observed ones. Nonetheless, the identification is
arguably not impervious to any unobserved characteristics. (Due to the lack of an ideal
experiment that could be emulated, this holds for any estimation strategy for conditional
aftereffects.) Therefore, it seems worth assessing in how far selection bias may remain an
issue. One approach to doing so is offered by Oster (2017), who developed an estimator
for the omitted variable bias. The idea is to compare the main estimator of interest to the
estimate of a simple regression of the outcome on the treatment variable. Ceteris paribus,
the closer the former is to the latter, the less the observed covariates seem to matter,
and the less bias is expected from omitting unobserved ones. Similarly, the better the
model with observed covariates explains the outcome and the worse the model without
covariates does, the less scope for omitted variable bias is left. In section 2.A.7 of the
appendix, I compute a version of Oster’s estimator. It suggests that for all results with
significant treatment effects, an inclusion of unobserved factors in the outcome model
would not change the ATE estimator enough to cancel out the treatment effect—even if
the influence of those factors was up to five times that of the observable factors. More-
over, adding observable characteristics to the simple regression moves the ATE estimate
further away from zero. So if the correlations of unobserved portion and observed portion
with the treatment variable have the same sign, if anything, one would expect the true
effects to be larger in absolute terms than the estimates. In summary, unobserved factors
are unlikely to invalidate the findings.
2.6 Conclusion
The positive effects of CCT programs like Progresa on school enrollment have been
demonstrated in numerous studies. However, surprisingly, their aftereffects have not been
explored so far. With this chapter, I try to fill this gap by estimating Progresa’s impact
on the probability to continue school after program payments stop. The main finding is
that for the eligible students, the program has large and significant negative aftereffects.
There are a number of possible explanations. Financial incentives may crowd out the
social norm of sending children to school or reduce the intrinsic motivation to attend
school regularly once they stop being in place. Establishing program payments and then
reducing them to zero again may convey the false signal that education is not worth it
at the later levels. Payments may shift parents’ income reference point such that the
2.6. CONCLUSION 37
sudden drop needs to be compensated by the child’s wage income. And a change in the
composition of students induced by the program may lead to negative classroom peer
effects. Though conclusive evidence in favor of one over the other explanations is lacking,
it seems that loss aversion and classroom peer effects are not much supported by the data,
leaving motivation crowding and anchoring as the remaining candidates.
The chapter also looks at possible spillovers to the students who were not eligible to
the program but lived in treatment villages. Curiously, it seems that—if anything—these
students are more likely to finish high school as a result of their peers getting paid. This
could be explained by a heightened desire of the non-poor students to separate themselves
from the poor through more education, or to prove their ability despite not getting paid.
Of course, the findings of this chapter are confined to the relatively short time the
program had been in effect by the year 2000. For younger cohorts who start middle school
with the program already in place, one may expect positive unconditional treatment
effects, via the intermediate positive effect the program has on middle school enrollment.
On the other hand, the conditional treatment effects might be even more extreme due to
a longer exposure to the program.
The main result is remarkable, as it constitutes a textbook case of unintended con-
sequences. It encourages to look further into how motivation and social norms change
through financial incentives. It raises the question of whether a potential motivation
crowding effect carries on to higher education, vocational training, or the labor market,
and whether it shows not only in participation but also performance. Moreover, the find-
ing should be considered in the program design of future CCT programs. Even in cases
where coverage on all school levels is not feasible due to budgetary constraints, there
may be ways to counter the adverse program effect. This could, for instance, be done
by systematically informing students and parents about the marginal rate of return to
continued education. Another way may be to let go of the conditionality of payments
altogether, particularly to counter possible crowding-out effects and anchoring. Further
research that explores these channels may help to mitigate the negative side effects of
CCT programs.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 List of Pre-treatment Characteristics
Table 2.A.1: Pre-treatment characteristics
Variable description Type
Student and household characteristics
Student is female binary
Age of student in 1997 continuous
Degree of poverty index in 1997 (by 1997 criteria) continuous
Degree of poverty index in 1997 (by 2003 criteria) continuous




Number of household members below age 15 count
Father lives in the household binary
Mother lives in the household binary
Father is literate binary
Mother is literate binary
Father went to school binary
Mother went to school binary
Father finished at least primary school binary
Mother finished at least primary school binary
Father finished at least middle school binary
Mother finished at least middle school binary
Student attended school in October 1997 binary
Student attended school in March 1998 binary
Parents’ assessments and opinions
Parents say student is good at school in 1998 binary
Parents say student is able to finish middle school binary
Parents say student is able to continue after middle school binary
Parents say student can finish high school binary
Parents say student is able to finish university binary
Desired level of schooling for girls is at least middle school binary
Desired level of schooling for girls is more than middle school binary
Desired level of schooling for girls is at least high school binary
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Table 2.A.1: Pre-treatment characteristics
Variable description Type
Desired level of schooling for girls is university binary
Desired level of schooling for boys is at least middle school binary
Desired level of schooling for boys is more than middle school binary
Desired level of schooling for boys is at least high school binary
Desired level of schooling for boys is university binary
Children eat breakfast before school binary
Reason why children don’t eat breakfast before school categorical
Parent talked to teacher this year binary
Reason for talk with teacher categorical
Parent participates in parent / guardian association of school binary
Parent participates in school work binary
In school, there are problems with lack of discipline binary
In school, there are problems with lack of interest of the teachers binary
In school, there are problems with poor communication between
teachers and parents
binary
In school, there are problems with poor teacher attendance binary
The teacher is usually prepared binary
The teacher is usually fulfilled binary
The teacher is usually on time binary
The teacher is usually patient with the children binary
Age from which girls can help younger siblings continuous
Age from which boys can help younger siblings continuous
Age from which girls can help with work continuous
Age from which boys can help with work continuous
Age from which girls can work to earn money continuous
Age from which boys can work to earn money continuous
Household expenditures
Weekly expenditures for public transport to school continuous
Weekly expenditures for public transport for other trips continuous
Weekly expenditures for cigarettes and tobacco continuous
Weekly expenditures for alcoholic beverages continuous
Weekly expenditures for nonalcoholic beverages continuous
Monthly expenditures for hygiene items continuous
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Table 2.A.1: Pre-treatment characteristics
Variable description Type
Monthly expenditures for medicine continuous
Monthly expenditures for medical consultations continuous
Biannual expenditures for household articles continuous
Biannual expenditures for toys continuous
Biannual expenditures for girls’ clothes continuous
Biannual expenditures for boys’ clothes continuous
Biannual expenditures for women’s clothes continuous
Biannual expenditures for men’s clothes continuous
Biannual expenditures for girls’ shoes continuous
Biannual expenditures for boys’ shoes continuous
Biannual expenditures for women’s shoes continuous
Biannual expenditures for men’s shoes continuous
Biannual expenditures for school supplies continuous
Biannual expenditures for school contributions continuous
If family had more money, they would spend it on food rank
If family had more money, they would spend it on housing repairs rank
If family had more money, they would spend it on clothing or shoes rank
If family had more money, they would spend it on debt settlement rank
If family had more money, they would spend it on animals rank
If family had more money, they would spend it on seeds or plants rank
If family had more money, they would spend it on work tools rank
If family had more money, they would spend it on medicine rank
If family had more money, they would spend it on school supplies rank
If family had more money, they would save it rank
Location characteristics
Marginality index continuous
Degree of marginality very high (1) or high (0) in 1997 binary
Village is indigenous binary
Village has a municipal delegate binary
Village has a municipal subdelegate binary
Village has a commissioner of agricultural land binary
Village has a commissioner of communal goods binary
Village has a municipal development committee binary
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Table 2.A.1: Pre-treatment characteristics
Variable description Type
Village has a health committee binary
Village has a education committee binary
Village has a agricultural committee binary
Village has a Diconsa store officer binary
Village has a production cooperative binary
Village has religious organizations binary
Village has political organizations binary
Village has a school parent association binary
Village has community assemblies binary
Village has NGOs binary
Village has a communal work system (tequio) binary
Source of water categorical
Type of garbage disposal categorical
Electricity available everywhere binary
Electricity at least partly available binary
Public drainage at least partly available binary
Public phone available binary
Number of preschools count
Number of primary schools count
Number of distance middle schools count
Most important sector in this village categorical
Second most important sector in this village categorical
Third most important sector in this village categorical
Child labor takes place in this village binary
Average daily salary paid to children continuous
Number of inhabitants count
Number of poor inhabitants count
Number of primary school graduates between 11 and 14 count
Share among inhabitants of primary school graduates between 11 and
14
share
Number of poor primary school graduates between 11 and 14 count
Share among poor inhabitants of primary school graduates between 11
and 14
share
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Table 2.A.1: Pre-treatment characteristics
Variable description Type
Number of primary school graduates between 11 and 14 enrolled in
1997
count
Share among inhabitants of primary school graduates between 11 and
14 enrolled in 1997
share
Number of poor primary school graduates between 11 and 14 enrolled
in 1997
count
Share among poor inhabitants of prim. school graduates between 11
and 14 enrolled in 1997
share
Number of inhabitants who completed at least primary school count
Share among inhabitants who completed at least primary school share
Share among inhabitants between 15 and 20 who completed at least
primary school
share
Share among inhabitants between 21 and 30 who completed at least
primary school
share
Number of poor inhabitants who completed at least primary school count
Share among poor inhabitants who completed at least primary school share
Share among poor inhabitants between 15 and 20 who completed at
least primary school
share
Share among poor inhabitants between 21 and 30 who completed at
least primary school
share
Number of inhabitants who completed at least secondary school count
Share among inhabitants who completed at least secondary school share
Share among inhabitants between 15 and 20 who completed at least
secondary school
share
Share among inhabitants between 21 and 30 who completed at least
secondary school
share
Number of poor inhabitants who completed at least secondary school count
Share among poor inhabitants who completed at least secondary school share
Share among poor inhabitants between 15 and 20 who completed at
least secondary school
share
Share among poor inhabitants between 21 and 30 who completed at
least secondary school
share
Number of inhabitants who completed at least high school count
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Table 2.A.1: Pre-treatment characteristics
Variable description Type
Share among inhabitants who completed at least high school share
Share among inhabitants between 15 and 20 who completed at least
high school
share
Share among inhabitants between 21 and 30 who completed at least
high school
share
Number of poor inhabitants who completed at least high school count
Share among poor inhabitants who completed at least high school share
Share among poor inhabitants between 15 and 20 who completed at
least high school
share
Share among poor inhabitants between 21 and 30 who completed at
least high school
share
Travel time (minutes) to nearest private middle school continuous
Travel time (minutes) to nearest public middle school continuous
Travel time (minutes) to nearest distance middle school continuous
Travel time (minutes) to nearest middle school continuous
Travel time (minutes) to nearest private high school continuous
Travel time (minutes) to nearest public high school continuous
Travel time (minutes) to nearest high school continuous
Travel time (minutes) to nearest national college of technical
professional education
continuous
Travel time (minutes) to nearest agricultural technological center continuous
Travel time (minutes) to nearest industrial technology and services
center
continuous
Travel time (minutes) to nearest agricultural college continuous
Travel time (minutes) to nearest industrial and services college continuous
2.A.2 Score Functions
For the model without attrition, Chernozhukov et al. (2018) show that under a number of
regularity conditions—particularly concerning the speed at which the nuisance functions
η converge to their true values η0—and using Neyman-orthogonal moment conditions as
well as cross-fitting, their estimators of the ATE and the ATT (average treatment effect
of the treated) are
√
N -consistent and asymptotically normal. The authors state that a
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rate is shown to be achievable for a variety of data generating processes in conjunction
with specific machine learning methods. Given the possibility to aggregate or choose the
best out of multiple machine learning methods, this guarantees estimability for a wide
range of problems.
A Neyman-orthogonal score function for the ATE is
ψθ (W ; θ, η) = g (1, X)− g (0, X) +
D (Y − g (1, X))
m (X)
(2.A.1)
− (1−D) (Y − g (0, X))
1−m (X) − θ,
with data W = (Y,D,X) and nuisance functions η (X) = (g (1, X) , g (0, X) ,m (X)).
The true value of η is η0 (X) = (g0 (1, X) , g0 (0, X) ,m0 (X)). A Neyman-orthogonal
score function for the ATN is
ψγ (W ; γ, η) =
D (1−m (X)) (Y − g (1, X))
m (X) (1− pD)









with nuisance functions η (X) = (g (1, X) , g (0, X) ,m (X) , pD). Here, the true value of η
is η0 (X) = (g0 (1, X) , g0 (0, X) ,m0 (X) ,E [D]).
For the model with attrition, the moment conditions need to be adapted to the fact
that not all outcomes are observed. This entails that treated observations with ob-
served outcomes are weighted by the inverse conditional probability of being observed
and treated. Non-treated observations with observed outcomes are weighted by the in-
verse conditional probability of being observed and non-treated.
Let q0 (D,X) := Dr0 (1, X)m0 (X) + (1−D) r0 (0, X) (1−m0 (X)). Then, the corre-
sponding score function for the ATE is
ϕθ (W ; θ, η) = g (1, X)− g (0, X) +
RD (Y − g (1, X))
q (1, X)
(2.A.3)
− R (1−D) (Y − g (0, X))
q (0, X)
− θ,
with data W = (Y,D,R,X) and nuisance functions η (X) = (g (1, X) , g (0, X), q (1, X),
q (0, X)) whose true value is η0 (X) = (g0 (1, X) , g0 (0, X), r0 (1, X)m0 (X), r0 (0, X) (1−m0 (X))).
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For the ATN, the corresponding score function is
ϕγ (W ; γ, η) =
RD (Y − g (1, X)) (1−m (X))
q (1, X) (1− pD)
− R (1−D) (Y − g (0, X))
r (0, X) (1− pD)
(2.A.4)
+





with nuisance functions η (X) = (g (1, X) , g (0, X) ,m (X) , r (0, X) , q (1, X) , pD), having
true value η0 (X) = (g0 (1, X) , g0 (0, X) ,m0 (X) , r0 (0, X) , r0 (1, X)m0 (X) ,E [D]).
2.A.3 Repeated Cross-fitting
The cross-fitting procedure works the same way for all score functions; I use ψθ as the
example here. For a fixed integer K, the sample is randomly split into folds I1, . . . , IK of
roughly equal size with no overlapping locations. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, the nuisance
functions are estimated using only the observations outside of Ik. The resulting functional
estimates are then used to predict η0 (X) in fold Ik. The predictions over all folds are in





W ; θ̂, η̂
￿￿
= 0. (2.A.5)
The sample-splitting procedure itself also introduces additional uncertainty. There-
fore, the above procedure is repeated a number of times B with different random splits.
The final estimator is then put together via the median method suggested by Cher-























In this chapter, I obtain σ̂2
b
via a wild cluster bootstrap over the values of ψθ
￿
W ; θ̂b, η̂b
￿
.
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2.A.4 Inference for the Model with Attrition
The following theorem parallels Theorem 5.1 in Chernozhukov et al. (2018), stating that
the DML estimators of the ATE and the ATN for the model with attrition are approxi-
mately unbiased and asymptotically normal.
Expectation and probability operators as well as norms are always with respect to a
probability measure P of the data W = (Y,D,R,X). I use ￿·￿
q
to denote the Lq (P )





n=1 be sequences of positive constants approaching 0, and let ε, c, C, C ￿,
and q be positive constants, with q > 2.
Theorem. Assume that the following conditions hold: (a) equations (2.3.10) –
(2.3.12) hold; (b) ￿Y ￿
q
≤ C; (c) Pr (ε ≤ q0 (D,X) ≤ 1− ε) = 1; (d) Pr (ε ≤ r0 (D,X)) =





TN with P -probability no less than 1 − ∆N , where the realization set TN is a shrinking
neighborhood of η0 containing all the nuisance parameter estimates η that obey the fol-








≤ 12 − ε,
￿r￿∞ ≥ ε, and ￿g − g0￿2 ×(￿m−m0￿2 + ￿r − r0￿2 + ￿q − q0￿2)≤ δNN−1/2. Then, the













(W ; θ0, η0)] as well as
√













(W ; γ0, η0)
￿
.
Proof: The proof follows along the same lines as the one given in Chernozhukov
et al. (2018, pp. 65–68) for the model without attrition. I confine myself to showing it
for the ATN, omitting the ATE. It suffices to show that the score function ϕγ fulfills the
conditions given in Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 in Chernozhukov et al. These conditions are
Neyman-orthogonality, identifiability, non-degenerate variance, and some conditions on
the quality of the nuisance parameter estimates. I go through these conditions separately.
Once they are established, the above theorem follows from Theorem 3.1 in Chernozhukov
et al.
Neyman-orthogonality Neyman-orthogonality of the score function means that at
the true parameter values γ0 and η0, ϕγ obeys the moment conditions E [ϕγ (W ; γ0, η0)]
= 0, and that for nuisance parameter estimate η ∈ TN , the Gateaux derivative in the





E [ϕγ (W ; γ0, η0)] [η − η0] =
∂
∂t
E [ϕγ (W ; γ0, η0 + t (η − η0))] |t=0
= E
￿
DR (g0 (1, X)− g (1, X)) (1−m0 (X))




DR (Y − g0 (1, X)) (1−m0 (X)) (q0 (1, X)− q (1, X))
q0 (1, X)




DR (Y − g0 (1, X)) (m0 (X)−m (X))




DR (Y − g0 (1, X)) (1−m0 (X)) (E [D]− pD)




(1−D)R (g0 (0, X)− g (0, X))




(1−D)R (Y − g0 (0, X)) (r0 (0, X)− r (0, X))
r0 (0, X)




(1−D)R (Y − g0 (0, X)) (E [D]− pD)



















(g0 (1, X)− g (1, X)) (1−m0 (X))
1− E [D]
￿
+ 0 + 0− 0
− E
￿
(g0 (0, X)− g (0, X)) (1−m0 (X))
1− E [D]
￿
− 0 + 0
− E
￿
(1−m0 (X)) (g0 (1, X)− g (1, X)− g0 (0, X) + g (0, X))
1− E [D]
￿
− E [D]− pD
(1− E [D])2
E [(1−D) (g0 (1, X)− g0 (0, X)− γ0)]
= 0
by the law of iterated expectations, since E [Y − g0 (1, X) |D = 1] = 0,













= E [(1−D) |X] = 1−m0 (X),
and E [g0 (1, X)− g0 (0, X)− γ0|D = 0] = 0.
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(W ; η) = − 1−D1−pD . In order for γ to be identified, ϕ
a
γ
(W ; η) needs to be a nonzero











(W ; γ0, η0)
￿










RD (Y − g0 (1, X)) (1−m0 (X))
q0 (1, X) (1− E [D])
− R (1−D) (Y − g0 (0, X))




(1−D) (g0 (1, X)− g0 (0, X))






RD (Y − g0 (1, X)) (1−m0 (X))
q0 (1, X) (1− E [D])
− R (1−D) (Y − g0 (0, X))




RD (Y − g0 (1, X))2 (1−m0 (X))2
q0 (1, X)
2 (1− E [D])2
+
R (1−D) (Y − g0 (0, X))2
r0 (0, X)




RD (Y − g0 (1, X))2 (1−m0 (X))2
q0 (1, X)
2 (1− E [D])2
= +
R (1−D) (Y − g0 (0, X))2 (1−m0 (X))2
q0 (0, X)







D (Y − g0 (1, X))2
q0 (1, X)
2 +

























Existence of Moments The last set of conditions concerns the quality of the nui-
sance parameter estimators η ∈ TN . The first condition is the existence of all moments of






are bounded from above. It holds that
E [|ϕγ (W ; γ0, η)|q]
1
q = ￿ϕγ (W ; γ0, η)￿q
=
￿￿￿￿
RD (Y − g (1, X)) (1−m (X))
q (1, X) (1− pD)
− R (1−D) (Y − g (0, X))
r (0, X) (1− pD)
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+








RD (Y − g (1, X)) (1−m (X))





R (1−D) (Y − g (0, X))
































+ ￿g (0, X)￿
q
￿
































and |γ0| are bounded by assumption, and Chernozhukov et al. (2018, pp. 66–67)
show that ￿g0 (0, X)￿q, ￿g0 (1, X)￿q, ￿g (0, X)− g0 (0, X)￿q, and ￿g (1, X)− g0 (1, X)￿q
are bounded by C/ε
1
q .









Statistical Rates The remaining conditions characterize the statistical rates with which
















￿￿￿ ≤ C ￿δN , (2.A.8)
sup
η∈TN































￿￿￿ ≤ δN1−pD ≤
C
￿
δN for C ￿ ≥ 11−pD , which gives (2.A.8). To show (2.A.9), note that by the triangle
inequality,
￿ϕγ (W ; γ0, η)− ϕγ (W ; γ0, η0)￿2 ≤ I1 + I2 + I3 + I4,
































For I1, it holds that
I1 ≤ ε−2 (1− pmax)−2 ￿RD (Y − g (1, X)) (1−m (X)) q0 (1, X) (1− E [D])
−RD (Y − g0 (1, X)) (1−m0 (X)) q (1, X) (1− pD)￿2
≤ ε−2 (1− pmax)−2 ￿(g0 (1, X) + U − g (1, X)) (1−m (X)) q0 (1, X) (1− E [D])
−U (1−m0 (X)) q (1, X) (1− pD)￿2
≤ ε−2 (1− pmax)−2 (￿(g (1, X)− g0 (1, X)) (1−m (X)) q0 (1, X) (1− E [D])￿2
+ ￿U ((1−m (X)) q0 (1, X) (1− E [D])− (1−m0 (X)) q (1, X) (1− pD))￿2)
≤ ε−2 (1− pmax)−2
￿
￿(g (1, X)− g0 (1, X))￿2
+
√
C ￿(1−m0 (X) +m0 (X)−m (X)) q0 (1, X) (1− E [D])
− (1−m0 (X)) (q0 (1, X) + q (1, X)− q0 (1, X)) (1− E [D]− pD + E [D])￿2
￿






C ￿(m0 (X)−m (X)) q0 (1, X) (1− E [D])
+ (1−m0 (X)) (q0 (1, X)) (pD − E [D])− (1−m0 (X)) (q (1, X)− q0 (1, X)) (1− E [D])
+ (1−m0 (X)) (q (1, X)− q0 (1, X)) (pD − E [D])￿2
￿






C (￿m0 (X)−m (X)￿2 + ￿pD − E [D]￿2
+ ￿q (1, X)− q0 (1, X)￿2 + ￿(q (1, X)− q0 (1, X)) (pD − E [D])￿2)
￿









with pmax := max {pD,E [D]}. Similarly,
I2 ≤ ε−2 (1− pD)−2 ￿R (1−D) (Y − g (0, X)) r0 (0, X) (1− E [D])
−R (1−D) (Y − g0 (0, X)) r (0, X) (1− pD)￿2
≤ ε−2 (1− pD)−2 ￿(g0 (0, X) + U − g (0, X)) r0 (0, X) (1− E [D])− Ur (0, X) (1− pD)￿2
≤ ε−2 (1− pD)−2 ￿(g0 (0, X)− g (0, X)) r0 (0, X) (1− E [D])
+U (r0 (0, X) (1− E [D])− r (0, X) (1− pD))￿2
≤ ε−2 (1− pD)−2
￿
￿(g0 (0, X)− g (0, X))￿2 +
√
C ￿r0 (0, X) (1− E [D])− r (0, X) (1− pD)￿2
￿
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≤ ε−2 (1− pD)−2
￿
￿(g0 (0, X)− g (0, X))￿2 +
√
C ￿r0 (0, X) (1− E [D])
−r (0, X) (1− E [D])− r (0, X) (E [D]− pD)￿2)






C (￿r0 (0, X)− r (0, X)￿2 + ￿E [D]− pD￿2)
￿









I3 ≤ (1− pD)−2 ￿ (1−D) (g (1, X)− g (0, X)) (1− E [D])
− (1−D) (g0 (1, X)− g0 (0, X)) (1− pD)￿2
≤ (1− pD)−2 ￿(g (1, X)− g0 (1, X)− g (0, X) + g0 (0, X)) (1− E [D])
− (g0 (1, X)− g0 (0, X)) (E [D]− pD)￿2
≤ (1− pD)−2 (￿g (1, X)− g0 (1, X)￿2 + ￿g (0, X)− g0 (0, X)￿2
+ ￿g0 (1, X)￿2 + ￿g0 (0, X)￿2)
≤ (1− pD)−2 4ε−
1
2 δN ,
I4 ≤ (1− pD)−2 ￿γ0 (1−D) (pD − E [D])￿2
≤ (1− pD)−2 γ0δN .
























δN ≤ C ￿δN .
Lastly, for t ∈ (0, 1), ∂2
∂t2





(pD − E [D]) (m0 (X)−m (X) + pD − E [D] + (m (X)−m0 (X)) E [D] +m0 (X) (E [D]− pD))
× (q0 (1, X) + t (q (1, X)− q0 (1, X)))2 (Y − g0 (1, X)− t (g (1, X)− g0 (1, X)))
+ ((Y − g0 (1, X)) (q (1, X)− q0 (1, X)) + (g (1, X)− g0 (1, X)) q0 (1, X))
×
￿
((m (X)−m0 (X)) (1− E [D]) + E [D]− pD −m0 (X) (E [D]− pD))
× (E [D]− 1 + t (pD − E [D])) ((q0 (1, X)− q (1, X)) t− q0 (1, X))











(g (0, X)− g0 (0, X)) (1− E [D] + t (E [D]− pD))
× (−r0 (0, X) + t (r0 (0, X)− r (0, X)))
× ((r0 (0, X)− r (0, X)) (1− E [D] + t (2E [D]− 2pD)) + r0 (0, X) (pD − E [D]))
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+
￿
(r (0, X)− r0 (0, X))2 (1− E [D] + t (E [D]− pD))2
− (pD − E [D]) (r (0, X)− r0 (0, X)) (1− E [D] + t (E [D]− pD))
× (r0 (0, X) + t (r (0, X)− r0 (0, X)))
+ (pD − E [D])2 (r0 (0, X) + t (r (0, X)− r0 (0, X)))2
￿









(1−D) (pD − E [D])
￿
(g0 (0, X)− g0 (1, X)) (pD − E [D])
+ (g (0, X)− g0 (0, X) + g0 (1, X)− g (1, X)) (1− E [D])
￿





(1−D) γ0 (pD − E [D])2 / (1− E [D] + t (E [D]− pD))3
￿
.
By assumption we have DR (Y − g (1, X)) = DRU ,
(1−D)R (Y − g0 (0, X)) = (1−D)RU , E [U |D,R,X] = 0,
￿g (D,X)− g0 (D,X)￿2 × ￿m (X)−m0 (X)￿2 ≤ δNN−1/2,
￿g (D,X)− g0 (D,X)￿2 × ￿r (D,X)− r0 (D,X)￿2 ≤ δNN−1/2,
￿g (D,X)− g0 (D,X)￿2 × ￿q (D,X)− q0 (D,X)￿2 ≤ δNN−1/2.
In addition, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l} : ￿pD − E [D]￿2 × ￿￿i − ￿0,i￿2 ≤ δNN−1/2 since the sample
















with constant C ￿ depending only on ε, γ0, and pmax. This concludes the proof. ￿
2.A.5 Data Preparation and Hyperparameter Tuning
For the random forest, boosted trees, and SVM, the dictionary of considered controls en-
compasses all the variables listed in Table 2.A.1, with categorical variables expanded into
dummy variables. For the regularized regression techniques, I use an extended set of can-
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didate variables. Next to the variables already mentioned, it includes squared and cubed
terms of all numerical variables, and cubic B-splines with five interior knots of three con-
tinuous variables—two household poverty indices and a village-level poverty index. Last
of all, it includes interactions of all the previously mentioned variables with a subset of
28 variables that are deemed particularly relevant; these include student characteristics,
household demographics, parents’ education and expectations, local wages paid to chil-
dren, and poverty levels. Missing values are treated as follows: for categorical variables, a
new missing category is created. For numerical variables, missing entries are assigned the
average of all non-missing entries, and an additional missing dummy is created. Extreme
gradient boosting is the only method which does not require missing value imputation.
After dropping duplicates and perfectly collinear variables, the basic dictionary of vari-
ables for the eligible students in the conditional sample includes 222 variables, whereas the
extended dictionary includes 16,395 variables. The sets of variables for the non-eligible
students, as well as for eligible and non-eligible students in the unconditional sample, are
very similar in magnitude.
To obtain the best possible prediction model for each machine learning method and
nuisance function, a number of hyperparameters need to be selected. For the regularized
regression techniques, these include the ￿1 and ￿2 regularization parameters. For SVM,
they are the cost as well as the parameter γ for the radial basis kernel. For boosting with
logistic regression trees, the parameters are number of boosting iterations, learning rate,
maximal tree depth, minimum loss reduction, subsample ratio of training set observations,
subsample ratio of variables, and minimum sum of instance weight per leaf. For random
forests, where overfitting is not a concern, I go without hyperparameter tuning and simply
choose a large enough number of trees (1,000) and a leaf size of 1.
For each nuisance function and method, I create a grid with likely values for the
hyperparameters and run a repeated cross-validation. To that end, the dataset is split in
the same way as for the cross-fitting procedure, i.e., in 10 folds, with roughly equal ratios
of treated observations, and with no overlapping locations. For each hyperparameter
vector from the grid, the model is tuned in 9 folds and predictions made in the remaining
fold. This is done separately for all 10 folds, and repeated a total of 10 times for different
random splits. In the end, the hyperparameter vector with the lowest average out-of-
sample mean squared error is selected.
2.A.6 Result Tables
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2.A.7 Omitted Variable Bias Estimation
In this section, I compute an estimator for the omitted variable bias by Oster (2017). Its
basis is an outcome model of the form
Y = Dθ + Z1 + Z2 + ￿, (2.A.11)
with an observed part Z1 = Xβ and an unobserved part Z2. This model is more restrictive
than the heterogeneous treatment effect model, most notably since both treatment status
D and observables X enter the outcome model linearly. This means that the results
presented here should merely be seen as back-of-the-envelope calculations. Let θ̂ be the
point estimate of the estimation excluding the unobservable part, and let θ̊ be the point
estimate of a simple regression of Y on D. Let R̊, R̂, and Rmax respectively denote the
R-squared of the simple regression model, of the model with observed characteristics,
and of the (hypothetical) outcome model with all observed and unobserved pre-treatment
variables included. Furthermore, let δ denote the relative importance of selection on the




















Among the components in equation (2.A.12), θ̂, θ̊, R̂, and R̊ are observed, while Rmax
and δ are not. Rmax represents the maximal R-squared achievable in a prediction of
Y using pre-treatment information, a value bounded from above by 1. It is reasonable
to expect Rmax to be lower than 1, for the following two reasons. First, all outcomes
are measured years after the time before treatment. Therefore, idiosyncratic shocks can
occur after the beginning of the treatment, which affect outcomes but are by definition
unpredictable using pre-treatment information. Second, any measurement error in Y
reduces predictability. For this exercise, I chose multiples of R̂ as possible values for
Rmax, with multipliers 2, 3, 4, and 5. I then calculate the value of δ for which the true
treatment effect would be zero, or Π̂ = θ̂. A value for δ that is far from 0 is unlikely—given
the effort to include all covariates that are highly correlated with D—and in turn means
a null result is unlikely. Oster argues that δ = 1 is an appropriate cutoff value, as this
implies that unobservables are as important as observables. I adopt this argument, with
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the qualification that cov (Z1, D) and cov (Z2, D) may have opposite signs. This means
that for any given Rmax, θ = 0 is rejected if |δ| > 1.
Table 2.A.14 shows the δ implied by θ = 0, where θ denotes the true average treat-




with i = 2, . . . , 5 and all samples and school-related
outcomes discussed in the chapter. It can be seen that for all results that are at least
significant at the 10% level, |δ| > 1 even if the unobserved variables explain three times
as much as the observed ones, i.e., if Rmax = 4R̂. A small caveat here is that the values
of θ̊ do not take account of observations with missing outcomes, whereas the values of
θ̂ do. Thus, for samples with some outcomes missing, the estimates of δ are likely still
too close to 0. For all those samples without missing observations, it holds that |δ| > 1
even if Rmax = 5R̂. In conclusion, even a significant amount of unobserved pre-treatment
information is likely not going to invalidate the main results.

































































































































































































































Welfare Measurement and Poverty
Targeting Based on Participatory
Wealth Rankings
Social security programs that target the poor are staple policies in many developing coun-
tries. Where tax bases are shallow and incidences of poverty high, selecting beneficiaries
is often preferred to universal coverage. The problem of how best to choose who should
be eligible is subject of ongoing discourse. A substantial branch of literature is concerned
with the question how well different targeting methods, e.g. proxy means testing, geo-
graphical targeting, participatory methods, or self-selection, align with certain targeting
objectives, usually poverty status as measured by consumption or income (Coady, Grosh
and Hoddinott, 2004; Zeller, Feulefack and Neef, 2006; Banerjee et al., 2009; Coady and
Parker, 2009; Yusuf, 2010; Alatas et al., 2012; Alatas et al., 2016; Alatas et al., 2019;
Bah et al., 2019; Karlan and Thuysbaert, 2019). A related yet less explored question
is how the method of targeting affects acceptance and satisfaction with the programs in
question.1 How well a targeted intervention is being received may depend on a number
of components: the degree to which the allocation meets shared intuitions of justice, the
amount of self-determination allowed to communities in the targeting process, as well as
1The significance of dissatisfaction due to targeting and program implementation can hardly be over-
stated. The Indonesian Direct Cash Assistance (Bantuan Langsung Tunai, or BLT) programs launched in
2005 and 2008 illustrate this point. For the implementation of 2005, Widjaja (2012) reports nationwide
protests, threats to staff of the Central Statistics Bureau, and cases of vandalism against government
facilities as a result of deficient program implementation. Cameron and Shah (2014) find for the same
program that an increase in crime and a decrease in people’s participation in community groups are
associated with mistargeting. Alatas et al. (2012) remark that for the 2008 implementation of the BLT
program, dissatisfaction with beneficiary lists was so immense that more than 2000 village officials refused
to participate in the program.
70 CHAPTER 3. PARTICIPATORY WELFARE MEASUREMENT
the extent to which the specific needs of different localities are met.
This chapter is an attempt to formalize these factors, and to identify how they impact
program satisfaction in the context of a field experiment on targeting in Indonesia, con-
ducted by Alatas et al. (2012). To understand what drives satisfaction with antipoverty
programs, it is essential to take into account local views of what constitutes poverty. One
way of doing so is through participatory approaches, where data collection and targeting
come with an active involvement of the local population. The prime example of such
approaches is the participatory wealth ranking (PWR): representatives of a community
rank all households according to their wealth. Such rankings can help to understand how
poverty is perceived by locals, and how different household characteristics are weighted
in the assessment. An important insight from PWRs is that local perceptions of welfare
differ systematically from the traditional assessments based on income or consumption
(Shaffer, 2013). Furthermore, evidence from field experiments suggests that participants
are generally satisfied with the results of interventions that use PWRs as the targeting
method (Alatas et al., 2012; Schüring, 2014). Taken together, these findings suggest that
PWRs are not only pragmatic ways to allocate benefits at the local level, but that they
may also be used as the basis for alternative welfare measures.
The first goal of the chapter is to demonstrate how welfare measures grounded in
local concepts of material well-being can be constructed from PWRs. The idea is to
estimate the relationship between rankings and household characteristics, and to predict
scores based on this model. The resulting welfare measure has a number of desirable
properties: it does not depend on preselected dimensions of wealth or deprivation, or
on predefined weights2; it does not rely on subjective categories of welfare; it can be
constructed for localities where no actual PWRs have been conducted; and it can be used
to relate households from different communities to each other, and thus overcome the
principal incomparability of ranking outcomes between villages. The new welfare scores
can in turn be used as targeting goals, or as benchmarks to assess targeting performance
and to measure local poverty.
A number of arguments can be made why these scores may be more appropriate
welfare indicators than consumption. Figures of consumption are usually constructed
on the basis of assets and expenses within the days before data collection. This means
that prospects for future consumption, income volatility, and the ability to smooth out
shocks, are not fully reflected in this measure—though they might be visible to other
locals and get incorporated in the PWRs. Furthermore, an antipoverty program should
2This distinguishes it from other concepts of multi-dimensional poverty, notably the one by Alkire and
Foster (2011).
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arguably not distribute benefits to households with the lowest consumption, but rather
to those with the highest need for them. Or the aim might be to facilitate yet another
welfare goal, such as equality of basic capabilities (Sen, 1980). If villagers share these
intuitions for distributive justice, the PWRs may lead to more favorable outcomes than
rankings based on consumption. Another attempt to assigning normative validity to
the outcomes of community rankings is offered by Kanbur and Shaffer (2007). They
view participatory approaches in the light of discourse ethics, according to which norms
receive validity through practical discourse—an ideal communicative exchange in which
participants engage in rational argumentation, and which allow the fair involvement of
everyone.3
The second goal of the chapter is to estimate the impact that targeting method, tar-
geting accuracy, and amount of provided benefits have on program satisfaction. I use
a dataset from a field experiment in Indonesia (Alatas et al., 2012), in which multiple
targeting methods were compared to distribute a one-time lump-sum payout. The ex-
periment contained three treatments regarding the within-village allocation of payments
to households: a proxy means test (i.e., a predicted consumption score), a PWR, and a
hybrid method between the first two. The authors of the study find that people in the
PWR villages were more satisfied than those who were targeted based on a proxy means
test. It is not clear, though, whether this difference in satisfaction is a result of PWRs
leading to an allocation more in line with people’s preferences, or because they grant
more agency in the allocation process. After defining a measure of targeting accuracy,
the experimental setup allows me to separate the impact of the participatory process and
of the degree to which the resulting allocation is aligned with the welfare measure. I find
that targeting accuracy based on perceived welfare has clearly positive impacts on various
outcomes related to program satisfaction. At the same time, there is hardly any evidence
that the ranking exercises themselves impact satisfaction, when controlling for targeting
accuracy. The effects on satisfaction of (mis)allocating benefits within and between vil-
lages can also be measured separately. The results suggest that, on average, reallocating
benefits within a village has a stronger effect on satisfaction than providing additional
benefits to the village.
3In how far this ideal of inclusiveness and equal treatment is being met depends on the design and
implementation of the PWR, as well as the cultural context. For the wealth rankings from Indonesia
considered in this chapter, Alatas et al. (2012) report that when all households of a community were
invited, almost half of them participated. The facilitators who moderated the meetings reported only in
15% of the meetings that a few individuals dominated the discussion about the rankings. This indicates
that in the case of this particular field experiment, the resulting rankings were indeed the product of
a relatively fair and democratic discourse. It is worthwhile to note, however, that the willingness to
participate in communal projects and to contribute to public goods in general may be uniquely high in
Indonesia for historical reasons (Mansuri and Rao, 2013, chapter 2).
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The satisfaction outcomes—besides being of inherent interest—also represent a yard-
stick against which to evaluate the adequacy of various welfare measures for targeting.
In addition to the measures based on local perceptions, I construct targeting accuracy
and local poverty based on per capita consumption and examine how they compare in
explaining satisfaction. It turns out that the measures based on perceived welfare have
a significantly stronger impact than the ones based on consumption. This holds up even
when considering only those villages that never conducted a PWR.
The results confirm that local perceptions of welfare are different from consumption-
based welfare, and show that this difference is large enough that choosing one over the
other as targeting goal translates into noticeable differences in satisfaction. Furthermore,
while understanding local perceptions of welfare is thus important for successful targeting,
the participatory process itself seems to matter little, if at all. This is a useful insight
especially for contexts in which PWRs may not be feasible.
The chapter continues as follows. Section 3.1 summarizes the field experiment and
the corresponding dataset of Alatas et al. (2012). In section 3.2, I outline the baseline
model of satisfaction and the construction of the different welfare measures, targeting
accuracy, and local poverty rates. The welfare prediction models and impact estimations
on satisfaction are discussed in section 3.3, and their results are presented in section 3.4.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.1 Summary of the Field Experiment and Data De-
scription
The paper by Alatas et al. (2012), which serves as the starting point and primary data
source for this study, describes a field experiment conducted in 640 villages in three
provinces of Indonesia: North Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and Central Java. The sample
of villages is randomly divided into three treatment groups, in which the beneficiary
households of an unconditional one-off cash transfer of 30,000 Indonesian Rupees (around
3 US$) are determined in different ways.
First, in the PMT group, household indicators for consumption were collected by the
Central Statistics Bureau (BPS) and composed into a proxy means test (PMT) score,
using a key that the government had determined through survey data. Households in
each village were then ranked according to the PMT score, and the lowest ranked house-
holds would receive the benefit. The number of benefits available for each village was
determined using an existing poverty map and the Village Potential Statistics (PODES)
dataset of 2008, and based on a PPP2$ per-day poverty line. Second, in the Community
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group, representatives of households in the village were invited to participate in a rank-
ing exercise, in which households were ranked from poorest to wealthiest. The poorest
households would then receive the benefit. A number of sub-treatments were conducted
to elicit whether the composition of participants led to any differences. Third, in the
Hybrid group, the same ranking was conducted as in the Community group, then the
BPS collected data to calculate PMT scores for the lowest ranked households, with the
cutoff being 1.5 times the number of available benefits for the village. The households
with the lowest PMT scores among them received the benefit.
The authors conducted a survey in all the participating villages and constructed a de-
tailed figure of per capita consumption for a sample of nine households per village. They
find that the rank-correlation between consumption and the rankings produced by the
treatment is highest for the PMT treatment and lowest for the Community treatment—
unsurprisingly, given the PMT score was meant to predict consumption. At the same
time, satisfaction with the program is higher for the Community treatment than for the
two other treatments. Furthermore, the authors do not find any evidence that different
subgroups (local elites, women) ranked households differently, that ethnic or religious mi-
norities were discriminated against, or that local community leaders or their relatives were
favored. The authors attribute the differences in rank correlation between the treatments
to a local understanding of poverty that differs from the consumption metric. Villagers
seem to weight especially those factors that are not decisive for consumption but con-
sumption capacity and the ability to smooth shocks. Households whose head was less
educated, widowed, disabled, seriously ill, or spent lots of money on tobacco or alcohol
were rated relatively lower conditional on consumption, while those with connections to
local elites were ranked relatively higher.
For this chapter, I use a variety of components from the dataset of Alatas et al. (2012).4
The first component is a baseline survey, which contains detailed household information
of nine households—the village head and eight households selected at random—from each
village, including the results of the ranking exercise and per capita consumption. The
baseline survey contains a total of 5,755 observed households. The second component is
the data collected by the BPS to obtain PMT scores. It was obtained for every household
in the PMT group and for about 47% of households in the Hybrid group. It contains basic
information about household demographics, education, occupation, and housing charac-
teristics. On top of that, information about some easily observable assets was collected,
including household appliances, electronic devices, livestock, vehicles, productive machin-
ery, and agricultural land. The BPS data includes 10,718 households for the PMT group
4Available online under http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1206.
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and 5,129 households for the Hybrid group. Table 3.A.1 in the appendix gives a complete
list of all the characteristics and assets that were available in both datasets and could
be successfully matched and meaningfully used. The baseline survey and the BPS data
are used to estimate the relationship between household characteristics and welfare. In
addition, the BPS data is used to construct measures of targeting accuracy and poverty
headcount for each village.
The third data component is an endline survey, conducted only in Central Java
province, with five out of the eight randomly selected households in each village. The
fourth component is another endline survey, conducted with the village leaders from all
the sampled villages. The two endline surveys are used to evaluate the impact of the
treatments and of targeting performance on satisfaction. They include several questions
revolving around satisfaction with the program, which are used to construct the set of out-
come variables. Households are being asked whether they are satisfied with the program
(on a scale of 1 to 4), and village heads are asked whether they think the people in the vil-
lage are satisfied with the program. Furthermore, village heads and households are asked
whether there are any poor households not covered by the program, whether there are
any households on the list of beneficiaries who do not belong there, whether the targeting
method is correct, whether targeting is worse, equal, or better than the method formerly
used for the Direct Cash Assistance (Bantuan Langsung Tunai, or BLT) programs, and
if there were too few, enough, or too many benefits given out in the village. For all these
questions, I treat answers such as “don’t know” or “no opinion” as missing. In addi-
tion, village heads were asked how many complaints about the list of beneficiaries they
received. Lastly, there was also a letter box for anonymous complaints, from which the
number of complaints is documented.5 The household and village level outcome variables
are summarized in Tables 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, respectively. These tables display a clear pat-
tern: the Community treatment group has significantly better6 outcomes than the Hybrid
and the PMT group, with only a few of the outcomes being statistically indistinguishable.
Similarly, the Hybrid group has either significantly better outcomes than the PMT group
(mostly for the outcomes at the village level) or is statistically indistinguishable (mostly
for the outcomes at the household level).
5The numbers of complaints are divided by the number of households in the village to make them
comparable. The resulting complaints per household are highly skewed, with very few villages registering a
lot of complaints. In order to avoid results being driven by a few extreme values, I use a log-transformation
of the complaint variables in the regressions. More precisely, in order to deal with zeros among the
complaint variables, 0.5 times the smallest non-zero value is added before taking the logarithm.
6Better here means: higher satisfaction, more agreement with the list of beneficiaries, fewer instances
of poor households not on the list or non-poor households on the list, the targeting method being more
correct and comparing favorably to the BLT method, the number of available benefits per village being
closer to correct, and fewer complaints to the village head and in the complaint box.
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3.2 Empirical Model
In this section, I first introduce a baseline model of satisfaction. Two of its components—
targeting accuracy and local poverty—depend on the choice of a welfare measure. The
construction these components and of the different welfare measures is discussed in the
subsections further below.
3.2.1 Model of Satisfaction
I propose a linear regression model to explain satisfaction:
yij = β0 + β1IH + β2IC + β3t
m
j
+ β4bj + β5h
m
j
+ β6xij + εij. (3.2.1)
yij stands for any of the satisfaction outcomes in Tables 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 for household i in
village j. For village level outcomes, subscript i becomes obsolete. IH and IC are indicators
for the Hybrid and the Community treatment group, respectively, with the PMT group
being the excluded category. tm
j
refers to within-village targeting accuracy, i.e., the share
of correctly targeted households given the available benefits, based on welfare measure m.




denotes the local poverty headcount ratio, which depends on the underlying welfare
measure m. xij is a vector of household and village characteristics that may potentially
affect satisfaction as well as targeting accuracy or benefit ratio. These characteristics
include regional dummies (for all combinations of the three provinces and urban/rural), log
village size, and—only for the outcomes from the endline household survey—dummies for
whether the household received the benefit and whether household members felt entitled
to it, as well as the interaction of the two.
Coefficients β1 and β2 indicate what difference the treatment group makes for satisfac-
tion, after controlling for how well the different treatments work at distributing funds to
the poor. In other words, they should tell how much participation is intrinsically valued.
β3 and β4 reveal the relative importance of (mis)allocation within villages and the total
amounts to be distributed to each village. Lastly, using different measures m can show
how well different concepts of welfare are able to explain the variation in satisfaction.
3.2.2 Within-village Targeting Accuracy and Welfare Measures
Within-village targeting accuracy shows how well the benefits available for a given village
are distributed. Let bij be an indicator that household i in village j with nj households
received the benefit, and let pm
ij
be an indicator that household i is among the poorest
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￿nj
k=1 bkj households in village j according to welfare measure m. Within-village targeting


















While the recipient households are fixed, the within-village rankings of welfare—and
thus pm
ij
—depend on how welfare m is being defined. (In what follows, superscripts m are
omitted where it serves readability.) One way to do so implicitly is to assume that welfare
is perfectly observed and reported by the participants of the PWR, which is sufficient to
define tj. I call this approach rank-consistent welfare. It implies that for the Community




bkj lowest ranked households. For the Hybrid treatment group, targeting accuracy
would be lower than 1 on average, as the allocation among the lowest ranked 1.5 · njbj
households was determined by a PMT score ranking instead of the PWR. For the PMT
group, targeting accuracy is not observed, as the villages in this group did not conduct a
PWR.
An alternative way to compute targeting accuracy using PWRs, which does allow to
include households that were not ranked, is to use predicted values based on a latent
welfare model with household characteristics. I call this approach rank-score welfare
(the word score indicating that this is an estimated rather than observed ranking). The
predicted ranking outcomes will inevitably differ to some degree from the order of the
actual PWRs. This may be seen as a disadvantage, as the true PWRs may reflect some
important factors that are not being asked for in the surveys, for instance because they
are sensitive or hard to quantify. But it may also be seen as an advantage, as the predicted
rankings only take into account the factors that are considered relevant in multiple villages,
while idiosyncratic factors such as a household’s popularity or connectedness to local elites
are left out of the score—a desirable effect.
Lastly, per capita consumption also constitutes a welfare measure. The BPS data does
not contain detailed enough information to construct these figures, though, so that only
predicted values can be used here as well.8 To train the consumption model, I use the
7There are other measures of targeting quality than accuracy, that assign different weights to poor
non-beneficiaries (type 1 errors) and non-poor beneficiaries (type 2 errors), or factor in the severity of
household poverty (see e.g. Ravallion, 2009). These are, however, largely incompatible with the ordinal
nature of a rank-based welfare measure, and with the fact that for within-village targeting, any type 1
error automatically also results in a type 2 error.
8Importantly, the PMT score, that also aimed at predicting per capita consumption based on the BPS
data, does a much poorer job than the prediction model used in this chapter: for the PMT group, the
correlation coefficient of log per capita consumption with the log PMT score is 0.53, while the correlation
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consumption figures from the baseline survey. In the following paragraphs, I outline how
consumption and rank-score welfare are being constructed.
To estimate the relation between welfare wij of household i in village j and observable
household characteristics zij, I assume a linear model,
wij = zijγ + ξij. (3.2.3)
When the welfare measure to be predicted is (log) consumption, 3.2.3 can be estimated
via OLS. For rank-score welfare, I propose to use a rank-ordered logit (ROL) model
(Beggs, Cardell and Hausman, 1981), which was originally developed to study consumer
preferences. The key assumption that needs to be made is that the random disturbance
term ξij in 3.2.3 is iid type I extreme value (EV1) distributed. In accordance with levels
of welfare, village j provides a complete ranking over the set of households, Rj. For ease
of notation, assume w1j < . . . < wnjj. The zero-probability case of equal welfare of two
households is being ignored here. The probability for any particular ranking to occur
given household characteristics Zj =
￿
z1j, . . . , znjj
￿￿ is then
Pr [Rj|Zj; γ] = Pr
￿
w1j < . . . < wnjj|Zj; γ
￿
(3.2.4)
= Pr [w1j < w2j|Zj; γ] · Pr [wij < w3j ∀i = 1, 2|Zj; γ] · . . .
. . . · Pr
￿










The ROL formula is a product of multinomial logit probabilities. Step 3.2.5 follows
from the assumption that the conditional distribution of the highest ranked household
from any subset is independent of the ranking of the other households. This is equivalent
to the irrelevance of independent alternatives (IIA) property, which follows from the EV1
specification of ξij. The reduction to the above closed-form expression allows estimation




ln (Pr [Rj|Zj; γ]) . (3.2.7)
Welfare scores ŵij can be then be predicted using estimated coefficients γ̂ just the same
way as in the model of consumption, ŵij = zij γ̂. These scores are ordinal, i.e., unlike
coefficient with the predicted per capita consumption estimated here is 0.72. This leads to large variation
in within-village targeting accuracy (based on predicted consumption), which is needed to identify its
impact on satisfaction.
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consumption scores they are not interpretable on their own.
3.2.3 Local Poverty Rate
An important control variable is the poverty headcount for each village. Constructing
this requires—in addition to welfare scores that allow comparisons of households between
villages—a global poverty threshold. While for some welfare measures, such as consump-
tion, there are natural poverty thresholds such as the 2$ per day poverty line, there is
none such for the rank-score welfare measure. For this chapter, I set the overall poverty
rate equal to the overall benefit ratio. This has the advantage that the total poverty rate
is the same across different welfare measures. It is also consistent with the poverty rate
implied by the 2$ per day consumption poverty line, which the total benefit ratio in the
field experiment aimed to meet.
Village poverty rates are computed as follows: welfare scores ŵm
ij
of households in the
entire sample are being ranked. The lowest ranked households are declared poor, hm
ij
= 1,
and the remaining ones non-poor, hm
ij


















3.2.4 Total Targeting Accuracy
Total targeting accuracy Tm
j
is constructed just like within-village targeting accuracy, but




















There are a number of reasons for using within-village targeting accuracy instead of
total targeting accuracy in model 3.2.1. To begin with, it is conceivable that mistargeting
within and between villages is perceived differently. Given that the targeting process has
two stages, targeting errors have their origins within and outside the village, which may
affect satisfaction in different ways. Violations of the ordering within the village may be
perceived stronger and as more unfair than missing the correct number of benefits given
the regional poverty line. In addition, for some of the welfare models being used it is
impossible to construct total targeting accuracy, while for others it is possible but at the
cost of relatively lower precision. Despite these caveats, total targeting accuracy may
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be a meaningful metric, and it is being used as a robustness check when comparing the
explanatory power of different welfare models.
3.3 Model Selection and Estimation
In this section, I first line out how the welfare scores are being constructed given a set
of predictors. I then go on to describe how the model of satisfaction is being estimated
given certain limitations in the data.
3.3.1 Model Selection
To account for regional differences in the factors and weights constituting welfare, each
welfare model is being estimated separately by province (North Sumatra, South Sulawesi,
and Central Java) and urban/rural areas. In order to achieve high predictive perfor-
mance, for each model and each sample, I use an alternating forward/backward model
selection procedure in order to identify an adequate set of variables from a list of potential
predictors. The procedure minimizes the bias-corrected Akaike information criterion, as
defined by Hurvich and Tsai (1989), which is asymptotically equivalent to leave-one-out
cross-validation. The candidate variables are taken from Table 3.A.1, extended by poly-
nomial terms and logarithms of age, household size, and floor area per capita, as well as
by interaction terms of gender and marriage status, of age and education, of education
and occupational sector, as well as a number of cluster-level variables and interactions of
all individual-level and cluster-level variables.
There are some subtle differences in the respective variable pools for the different
models. For the models of consumption, including village- or higher level variables as
predictors may help to increase the model fit. On the other hand, this is pointless when
using the ranking outcomes, as γ is identified only from comparisons of households within
villages. The inability of the ROL model to incorporate village-level variation is not
relevant for the construction of trank-score
j
, but it may render hrank-score
j
less reliable when
compared to the version based on consumption, hconsumption
j
. To what extent this is true
depends on how much of the variation in welfare is captured by household-level variables




, it may be helpful to include interactions of household-level variables with village-
level variables. These can emphasize local differences in the relative importance of certain
household level factors for poverty, and thus improve the estimated rankings. On the other






, interactions should not be included, as they would shift and scale welfare scores
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differently for each village. Since the ROL model does not actually relate households
from different villages to each other, such transformations would be arbitrary, and render
comparisons between villages impossible. This means, in particular, that total targeting
accuracy T rank-score
j
is constructed with a smaller set of potential predictors than within-
village targeting accuracy trank-score
j
, presumably leading to lower precision of the former
compared to the latter.
The prediction models of consumption are estimated using all the households in the
baseline survey. The prediction models of rank-score welfare are estimated based on the
BPS data of the Hybrid group. To prevent overfitting due to using the same villages
both for estimation and prediction, I use a one-village-out cross-fitting procedure: for the
predicted ranking in village j, the estimation includes all villages except j.
To construct tj and hj with a predicted ranking as benchmark, the joint distribution of
(bkj, zkj)k=1,...,nj is required. bij is known for every household in the PMT and the Hybrid
group, but zij is only fully observed for the PMT group, while in the Hybrid group it is
observed only for the 1.5 · njbj lowest-ranked households from the PWR. Therefore, for
estimations that involve the Hybrid group, I use imputed values t̂j and ĥj. The imputation
procedure is outlined in section 3.A.1 of the appendix, together with an assessment of the
bias arising from it. Table 3.3.1 gives a summary of all the information available for each
treatment group.
3.3.2 Estimation
Due to the fact that ranking and consumption data is not available for every household
of the experiment, equation (3.2.1) cannot be estimated directly. In particular, it is not
possible to construct targeting accuracy and local poverty based on rank-score welfare or
predicted consumption for the villages in the Community group, JC , since the kind of
data collected by the BPS for every household to construct PMT scores was not collected
there. On the other hand, for the Hybrid group JH and the Community group JH , it
is possible to construct targeting accuracy based on the true rankings—but not for the
PMT group JP , as no PWR was conducted there. To get around this issue, I conduct
separate sets of estimations.
The first one uses rank-score welfare and only villages from the Hybrid group and the
PMT group,







+ β6xij + εij, j ∈ JP ∪ JH . (3.3.1)
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The PMT group is the excluded category. Estimating equation 3.3.1 shows the difference
in intrinsic value between the PMT and the Hybrid ranking method, as well as the relative
significance of targeting accuracy.
The next set of estimations uses within-village targeting accuracy based on rank-
consistent welfare, and can only be applied to the Hybrid group and the Community
group:
yij = β0 + β2IC + β3t
rank-consistent
j
+ β4bj + β5￿aj + β6xij + εij, j ∈ JH ∪ JC . (3.3.2)
The Hybrid group is the excluded category. For the villages of the Community group,
local poverty rates are not available. Instead, I include the village attendance rate for
the PWR, aj, as an additional control. Since the ranking procedure and the allocation
mechanism were only explained at the meetings, aj should be independent of treatment
status, but it may proxy affluence and social capital, which could affect both targeting
accuracy as well as satisfaction. Estimating equation 3.3.2 shows the difference in intrinsic
value between the Hybrid and the Community ranking method.
A further set of estimations has the objective to compare the ability of rank-score
welfare and predicted consumption to explain satisfaction. This is done by pooling the
different measures of targeting accuracy and local poverty in one equation:













+ β6xij + εij, j ∈ JP . (3.3.3)
A significant estimate of, say, coefficient β31 means that targeting accuracy based on the
rank-score likely helps to explain the respective satisfaction outcome, given the informa-
tion provided by the targeting accuracy measure that is based on consumption. Equation
3.3.3 focuses on the PMT group, to avoid having to use imputations for targeting accuracy
or local poverty. Leaving out households from the Hybrid group also rules out a possible
bias caused by the degree to which the final allocation resembles the PWRs. For instance,
if people in the Hybrid group are asked to rank households, but then those rankings are
not being adhered to due to the second-stage ranking, people may feel actively ignored,
leading to lower satisfaction that would falsely be attributed to targeting accuracy alone.
These issues also apply to estimating 3.3.1, and will be addressed in the next section.
Equations 3.3.1 to 3.3.3 are estimated via OLS.9 For outcomes measured at the vil-
9Some of the outcomes yij are binary or ordered categorical. I also ran the corresponding regressions
as logit and ordered logit models, respectively. The relative coefficient sizes and p-values were almost
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lage level, heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used. For outcomes at the
household level, standard errors are clustered at the village level.
3.4 Results and Discussion
The results of estimating equation 3.3.1 for household level satisfaction outcomes are
shown in Table 3.4.1. The table also includes the results of a simple regression of the
satisfaction outcome on the treatment group, to see how much treatment effects change
after including covariates. Within-village targeting accuracy appears to be important
and is significant for most outcomes. Higher targeting accuracy increases satisfaction and
agreement with the list of beneficiaries, reduces the chance of households not being on the
list or wrong households to be included, and increases the likelihood that participants find
the allocation method to be correct. The effect of the Hybrid group, on the other hand, is
mostly small and insignificant, and does not show a consistent direction. However, when
compared to the simple regression results, one can see that including covariates pulls the
effect of the Hybrid group away from the expected direction for almost all outcomes.
The effect of the benefit ratio is mostly consistent with the effect of targeting accuracy:
more coverage increases satisfaction and reduces the chance of poor households being
excluded. While mostly having the same sign as the effect of targeting accuracy, the
magnitude of the effect of the benefit ratio is consistently lower. This means that on
average, adding a benefit to a village only increases satisfaction if the recipient household
is targeted correctly. Lastly, as one would expect, the impression of whether there were
enough benefits is strongly affected by the benefit ratio but not by within-village targeting
accuracy.
The results of the regressions of village level outcomes, reported in Table 3.4.2, show
a slightly different picture. Village heads believed on average that households in the
Hybrid group were more satisfied than in the PMT group, and that the targeting method
was better, even after controlling for targeting accuracy. However, this notion is not
supported by significant effects of the treatment group on list errors, or complaints to the
village head or in the complaint box. Targeting accuracy, on the other hand, did not only
increase perceived household satisfaction and correctness of the method, but also led to
significantly fewer complaints. Lastly, a higher share of beneficiaries led to a higher share
of village heads thinking that households were satisfied, fewer excluded poor households,
more non-poor households receiving benefits, and fewer complaints.
As mentioned earlier, two factors could bias the results in Tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.2: tar-
indistinguishable from those of the OLS results.
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geting accuracy and local poverty are imputed, and the targeting measure and allocation
method more or less coincide for the Hybrid group. Table 3.A.2 in the appendix shows
the results of the same estimations for the PMT group only, and using true targeting
accuracy and local poverty. The coefficients of targeting accuracy and benefit ratio are
statistically indistinguishable from those in Tables 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 and show no evidence
of bias in any direction.
Tables 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 show the results of estimating equation 3.3.2. The household
level outcomes show fewer significant impacts of targeting accuracy (which is now using
actual instead of predicted rankings as benchmark). This is likely due to higher standard
errors caused by the lack of variation in targeting accuracy for the Community treatment
group. However, the magnitudes in the effects on satisfaction and indicators of correctness
of the beneficiary list are comparable to those in Table 3.4.1. The village level outcomes
strongly suggest that targeting accuracy increases household satisfaction and correctness
of list and method, and reduces complaints to the village head. At the same time, the
effect of the Community group (versus the Hybrid group) is mostly insignificant and fairly
inconsistent in sign. This can partly be attributed to large standard errors, stemming from
a high correlation between targeting accuracy and treatment group. When comparing
the coefficients between the simple and multiple regressions, it becomes evident that
including targeting accuracy and other covariates strongly pulls the effect of the treatment
group away from its expected direction. Lastly, a higher share of beneficiaries increased
satisfaction and perceived correctness of list and method, and reduced complaints. Again,
the magnitude of these effects appears lower than that of within-village targeting accuracy.
In summary, household members and village heads seem to notice and appreciate
increases in targeting accuracy and the number of benefits. The effects of the treatment
group on satisfaction-related outcomes are mostly small and statistically insignificant. The
exception is that village heads perceived households to be more satisfied in the Hybrid
group than in the PMT group, and generally believed the former method was better
than the latter. This notion, however, is not backed up by the respective counterpart
variables at the household level, nor by significant effects of more tangible indicators of
dissatisfaction such as complaints received. It is thus possible that, while the targeting
method itself has little intrinsic value to most people, village heads have a preference
for an allocation by ranking. This might be due to a sense of importance derived from
being involved in the execution of the PWRs, or because PWRs were perceived to be
more different than the PMT method from the allocation method of the BLT, which was
deemed highly inadequate.
Tables 3.4.5 and 3.4.6 show the results of estimating equation 3.3.3. On the household











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 91
level, the results indicate that targeting accuracy based on rank-score welfare is signifi-
cantly predictive for most satisfaction outcomes—even conditional on targeting accuracy
measured by predicted consumption. The reverse is not true for any outcome. On the
village level, the same conclusion holds for the number of complaints to the village head
and in the complaint box. Taken together, these results suggest that targeting accuracy
explains satisfaction better when it is based on predicted ranks rather than predicted
consumption.
One reason for this might be that the consumption model simply has a lower predictive
performance than the model of ranks. After all, the two models are estimated based on
different samples: the consumption model uses the baseline survey of 9 households per
village, whereas the rank model uses all the households from the Hybrid group in the
BPS data. To rule out this potential element of unfairness in the comparison, I create
an alternative set of welfare scores based on a ROL model that uses the baseline survey
instead. Tables 3.A.3 and 3.A.4 in the appendix show estimations of equation 3.3.3 with
targeting accuracy and local poverty based on these new welfare scores. The results remain
qualitatively the same. Tables 3.A.5 and 3.A.6 in the appendix display estimation results
of estimating equation 3.3.3 using total targeting accuracy (and therefore leaving out
the benefit ratio). The results confirm the above findings, and show significant effects of
targeting accuracy based on rank-score welfare even for most of the village level outcomes.
Lastly, to confirm that the results are not a coincidental product of focusing on the
PMT group only, I also run the same regressions including the Hybrid group, using
imputed targeting accuracy and local poverty and including a treatment group dummy.
The results, reported in Tables 3.A.7 and 3.A.8 in the appendix, again remain qualitatively
unchanged.
The way in which local poverty would impact program satisfaction is not clear a
priori. However, one would expect that, controlling for the benefit ratio, villages with
higher poverty incidence register more omitted poor households and fewer targeted non-
poor households, and a comparatively less sufficient amount of benefits. The results in
the tables above and the appendix confirm this pattern for local poverty measured against
rank-score welfare, but not for consumption. It is noteworthy that the poverty rate based
on the ROL model—which does not take into account village level predictors and does
not compare households between villages—is able to pick up these relationships better
than the poverty rate based on a consumption regression model that does include village
level predictors.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































94 CHAPTER 3. PARTICIPATORY WELFARE MEASUREMENT
3.5 Conclusion
The findings in this chapter suggest that PWRs are popular largely due to their outcome,
not the procedure. Furthermore, allocations coinciding with scores from PWRs were
better-received than those coinciding with consumption scores. These insights could lead
to improvements in targeting: similar to PMT scores of consumption, one could use welfare
scores, trained on PWRs for a representative sample of villages. Then, the households with
the lowest scores below a predefined threshold are targeted. The targeting threshold could
come from a poverty map or be set according to budgetary restrictions. It could also come
from the PWR itself, for instance if it takes the form of a poverty classification exercise
instead of a continuous welfare ranking. The resulting scores combine the respective
strengths of proxy means tests and participatory approaches, in being objective and built
on observable factors while being founded in local views of welfare.
The findings may prove particularly useful for contexts in which conducting PWRs in
all target locations may not be feasible or desirable. This is the case for settings where
people cannot be expected to know most of the households in their neighborhood, or where
poverty is not deemed an appropriate topic to be discussed publicly. Further worries about
large scale PWRs might include selfish ranking behavior, discrimination, elite capture, or
coercion. Using welfare scores based on training PWRs without rank-dependent payouts
should mitigate such concerns.
Constructing and applying welfare scores based on PWRs leads to further interesting
problems and opens up several pathways for exploration. One avenue is refining the rank
prediction model. It may be worth it to take a closer look at the factors used, and to con-
sider further determinants of the rankings—particularly those related to welfare potential
rather than current material well-being—to be able to craft more focused questionnaires
and eventually more precise welfare scores. At the same time, the best fitted model may
not always be the most preferable one. The approach in this chapter has been to treat
PWR results as correct representations of welfare. Of course, this is adequate only if
the rankings contain no systematic biases on grounds of ethnicity, religion, gender, etc.
Going forward, it will be useful to watch out for such biases and understand the local
conditions that lead to them. Once identified, it may be prudent to purposefully leave out
any markers or correlates of traits eliciting such biases. Taking this one step further, one
could apply statistical debiasing techniques to the prediction algorithm, and thus weed
out biases against specific traits completely. I regard exploring such improvements of par-
ticipatory welfare scores, and their impact on allocations and satisfaction, as a worthwhile




In this section, I address the issue that the better-off households (according to the PWR) in
the Hybrid group do not appear in the BPS data. I subsume the Hybrid group households
represented in the BPS dataset under HHybrid1 and the other ones under H
Hybrid
2 . If we use
actual rankings as benchmark, the fact that the households in HHybrid2 are unobserved is
not a problem, as they are all counted as non-poor and did not receive the benefit, and
thus all count as correctly targeted. However when using predicted welfare as benchmark,
it cannot be ruled out that the model would have classified some of the unobserved
households as poor. Thus, in assuming that all of them were targeted correctly we would
overstate targeting accuracy.
I propose to look at the households within HHybrid2 that were visited for the baseline
survey, HHybrid, baseline2 , to get an average targeting accuracy for the unobserved part in
each village. To do so, I go through the following steps.
1. For the PMT group, I establish which households would most likely have been
included in the BPS survey, had they been in the Hybrid group instead. This is
to make predictions in the PMT group just as in the Hybrid group. With the
households in the BPS survey, I estimate a logit model of treatment status on
household characteristics, and assign propensity scores to the households of the
PMT group. The lower these are, the less likely it is to find a similar household
in the Hybrid group, meaning that its equivalent in the Hybrid group would less
likely have been included in the BPS data. I then rank households in each village j
of the PMT group by propensity score and subsume the min {1.5 · njbj, nj} highest
scoring households under the set HPMT1 , and the remaining ones under HPMT2 , with
subset HPMT, baseline2 of households observed in the baseline survey.
2. I predict welfare for the households in HPMT1 ∪HPMT2 and rank all of them accord-
ing to their score. I define the absolute poverty line as the welfare score of the
B
PMTth poorest household, with BPMT the number of benefits made available to all
households in the PMT group. Furthermore, for each village j in the PMT group I
compute tj and hj.
3. I predict welfare for the households in HHybrid1 ∪H
Hybrid, baseline
2 . Then for each village
j, both in the PMT group and the Hybrid group, I compute the reduced targeting
accuracy t1,j, that pretends the households in HPMT1 ∪ H
Hybrid
1 make up the entire
village.
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4. Using the households in HPMT, baseline2 and H
Hybrid, baseline





2 —the overall fractions of households below the local poverty lines
used to calculate t1,j in the step above. These averages are used as a proxy for
mistargeting among the households unobserved by the BPS. Since the number of
households per village in HPMT, baseline2 and H
Hybrid, baseline
2 is very low—0 in some
cases—it is not feasible to use village-specific averages instead.
5. Eventually, the two separate estimates are combined in the following way. I con-
struct two factors, z1,j = sjt1,j and z2,j = (1− sj) t2,g, where sj is the fraction of
households from HPMT1 ∪ H
Hybrid
1 in village j. I then regress tj on z1,j and z2,j for
the PMT villages and construct linear predictions, t̂j, for both the PMT group and
the Hybrid group.
The reason for not simply adding up z1,j and z2,j is that both t1,j and t2,g are not unbiased
estimates of their respective shares of targeting accuracy: t1,j does not take into account
that the poorer households in HPMT2 ∪H
Hybrid
2 may render some of the households declared
poor in HPMT1 ∪H
Hybrid
1 non-poor, and t2,g does not take into account that this is likely
to change the local poverty line.
Just as targeting accuracy, the local poverty rate hj also needs to be estimated, since
the total number of poor households is not observed for the Hybrid group. I take a slightly
different approach than for targeting accuracy, though, as the treatment group should have
no influence on the total amount of benefits (which was determined from a government
census, independently of the treatment group assignment). Therefore, predictions ĥj of
the poverty headcount for the PMT and the Hybrid group are made with the PMT group
as training data. As candidate predictors I use dummies for region, (log) village size,
the fraction of observed households sj, and the poverty headcount only considering the
households in HPMT1 ∪H
Hybrid
1 , as well as various transformations and interactions of these
variables. Just as in the welfare models, I use a stepwise model selection procedure as
well as cross-fitting to prevent overfitting.
Comparing the effects of tj and t̂j as well as hj and ĥj for rank-score welfare in the
PMT group shows that the imputation does not significantly change measured impacts.
The results of this comparison are available on request.
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3.A.2 Household and Location Characteristics




Age of household head
Gender of household head
Marriage status of household head
Number of children (between 0 and 4, going to primary school, going to
junior high school)
Dependency ratio
Village head lives in household
Education
Household head’s education (graduated from no school, primary school,
junior high school, high school or higher)
Household member with highest qualification (graduated from no
school, primary school, junior high school, high school or higher)
Occupation
Household head works in agricultural sector (including mining /
quarrying)
Household head works in industrial sector
Household head works in service sector
Housing characteristics
Privately owned house
Per capita floor area






Kitchen appliances (gas burner, fridge/freezer, rice cooker,
mixer/blender)
Electronic devices (air conditioning, fan, radio, TV, DVD/VCD player,
laptop/PC, dish antenna, cell phone)
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Table 3.A.1: List of household and location characteristics
Variable description
Livestock (poultry, pig, goat, cow/buffalo, horse)
Means of transport (bike, motorbike, car)
Productive machinery (sewing machine, electric pump)
Jewelry/gold
Household ever received credit
Village characteristics
Number of households
Schools (primary school, junior high school)





Mean agricultural land area
Subdistrict characteristics
Ratios of household heads working in agricultural / industrial / service
sector
Ratios of household heads graduated from no school / primary school /
junior high school / high school or higher
Mean per capita floor area
Mean agricultural land area
Ratio of households with clean drinking water




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Impact of Road Development on
Household Welfare in Rural Papua
New Guinea
Joint work with Eric Koomen, Menno Pradhan, and
Christopher Edmonds
Road access is one of the key elements necessary for rural economic development, gen-
erally offering the sole means for connecting people to markets and public services. Better
roads connect rural households to goods and labor markets, providing a greater variety
and lower prices of essential inputs and consumption goods, as well as higher prices and
demand for local products (Gibson and Rozelle, 2003). Increased market access may raise
local productivity and wages, and enable the transformation from subsistence agricul-
ture to growing cash crops and to non-agricultural activities, thus diversifying household
income sources (Mu and van de Walle, 2011; Aggarwal, 2018). Better roads may also
attract financial service providers, facilitating agricultural investments and consumption
smoothing (Binswanger, Khandker and Rosenzweig, 1993), and enhance access to and
quality of services like schools and hospitals (Bell and van Dillen, 2020).
Each of these factors suggests that better roads lead to higher average household con-
sumption, which is confirmed by several studies (Knox, Daccache and Hess, 2013). The
distributional effects of better roads, however, are less understood, and the relative bene-
fits to poor households are unclear. If better-off households are more able to compensate
a lack of good roads—say, because they can better smooth out their consumption dur-
ing seasons where roads are not usable, or through access to four-wheel drives—the poor
would experience a relatively higher productivity gain from improved roads. Conversely,
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non-poor households may benefit more from better roads, since they might be able to
scale up agricultural production more easily, or because the poor may be kept from road
utilization due to transport costs. The effects of roads on other development outcomes
beside consumption are also ambiguous. Non-agricultural employment may increase or
decrease as a result of better roads, depending on the relative change in agricultural
productivity. School enrollment may increase or decrease, depending on how infrastruc-
ture changes education returns and the opportunity cost of schooling (Adukia, Asher and
Novosad, 2020).
In this chapter, we investigate the effect of road quality on household welfare in rural
Papua New Guinea (PNG) between 1996 and 2010. PNG is a good case study ground
for the effects of rural infrastructure development, due to its limited road access and high
variability in road quality. In 2009, the country had a road density of 56 km per 1,000
square km, which is very low compared to other countries in the region (neighboring
Indonesia had 250 km per 1,000 square km). In the same year, only 13% of roads were
sealed, while the majority of roads were gravel or dirt roads.
We combine two household surveys with censuses as well as GIS datasets of the road
network from the time the household surveys were administered. The road map data
contains measures of surface type and condition for each road section of 100 meters.
Together with the location of households, we can calculate the distance to the nearest
road, and the quality and length of the shortest route leading to the nearest town. This
allows us to construct a set of road variables that captures quality at a very granular
level, considering not just the section proximate to the households but arguably the most
important road for each household in its entirety.
We use six indicators for household welfare: consumption, poverty status, household
engagement in subsistence farming, wage employment, housing quality, and school en-
rollment. Our results suggest that access to better roads increases consumption and
reduces poverty by facilitating the transition out of subsistence farming and into more
market-based agriculture. Access to better roads leads to a higher probability of living
in a house made of non-traditional material, and greater likelihood that children are en-
rolled in school. We also find that disadvantaged and more remote households benefit
comparatively more from upgraded roads.
To identify the impact of road quality on the route that leads to the nearest town,
we use a correlated random effects model to account for endogeneity of road quality.
Following the approach by Mundlak (1978), we correct for unobserved location-specific
effects by including the average of the road quality variables obtained from the two maps.
The resulting estimator is identical to the within estimator, despite the absence of panel
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data. Our results generally point to beneficial effects of sealing roads. The estimates
suggest that, between 1996 and 2010, upgrading one kilometer of the route leading to the
nearest town from dirt to sealed road surface increased average household consumption
by about 3.2%, raised the chance households lived in a house with a high-quality roof by
about 1.3 percentage points, reduced the probability a household relied on subsistence
farming by 0.5 percentage points, and increased the likelihood for a school-aged child to
be enrolled in school by 1.4 percentage points.
We also explore effect heterogeneity. Our model is run on several population subgroups
to see how the effect of road quality on consumption and poverty varies by remoteness
of the household, its education level, and its demographic characteristics. We find that
the effects on consumption and poverty are at least twice as high for households living
more than 30 km from the nearest town, when compared to those living closer than 30
km. In addition, we apply a generalized quantile regression estimator (Powell, 2020) to
investigate how the effects of road infrastructure vary across the consumption distribution.
This procedure allows to examine how different consumption quantiles are affected while
also accounting for covariates, making the results comparable to the results from our base
specification. Our estimates weakly indicate that the effect of upgrading dirt roads is
higher for the poorest households, suggesting that road works can be considered anti-
poverty measures in the case of rural PNG.
Our study contributes to the literature that assesses the impact of roads on rural
development outcomes at the household level. A particularly relevant paper is the one by
Gibson and Rozelle (2003) on PNG. Using data from the 1996 PNG Household Survey,
the authors show that reducing the travel time to the nearest road to a maximum of two
hours led to an overall reduction in poverty of between 5.8% and 11.8%.1 Our study
complements this paper by focusing on impacts of road quality rather than access.
Only a few studies have examined heterogeneity in the impacts of roads. Dercon
et al. (2009) find that access to an all-weather road in rural Ethiopia between 1994 and
2004 reduced poverty by 6.9 percentage points. They find no evidence of heterogeneity
of this effect across household characteristics like size of landholdings, livestock holdings,
or literacy of the household head. However, their estimates show the effect on consump-
tion growth is larger for households with landholdings of at least a hectare and a literate
household head. Dercon, Hoddinott and Woldehanna (2012) obtain complementary re-
sults, finding that remoteness from towns and poor roads are among the factors most
associated with chronic poverty. Khandker, Bakht and Koolwal (2009) investigate how
1We were able to replicate the study by Gibson and Rozelle (2003) for the new household survey data
from 2009/10, and can confirm the effect of distance to the nearest road and household consumption and
poverty. The replication analysis is available upon request.
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households in Bangladesh profited from road improvement projects. They predict that
villages next to an improved road experience a poverty reduction of 3-6 percentage points
over 4 years. The impact on household expenditure is higher for lower expenditure quin-
tiles in this study, suggesting that road investments are pro-poor. However, using a larger
dataset and controlling for other investment programs, Khandker and Koolwal (2010) find
the opposite pattern. Mu and van de Walle (2011) find positive and significant average
effects of rural road rehabilitation on local market development in Vietnam. The authors
note a tendency for poorer localities to have higher impacts due to lower levels of initial
market development. A replication study by Nguyen (2019) confirms these results.
Estimating the effects of transport infrastructure is complicated by the fact that gov-
ernment decisions about where to construct new roads, or whether to rehabilitate or
upgrade existing ones, are likely correlated with areas’ growth and other development
achievements. These decisions are often made based on unobserved factors like expected
traffic volume, local productivity, investment cost, and political benefits of placing roads
in particular areas—all factors that may also affect household welfare directly. An ex-
ample of political favoritism in road placement is provided by Burgess et al. (2015), who
find that during periods of autocracy in Kenya, road construction in each district was
governed strongly by whether the district had a large proportion of people from the same
ethnic affiliation as the current president.
Existing research in road development impacts has used a variety of approaches to
address this endogeneity problem. Instrumental variable estimation—which requires an
exogenous variable that affects road development but has no direct effect on the outcome
variable of interest—is one approach (e.g. Gibson and Rozelle, 2003; Gertler et al., 2016;
Banerjee, Duflo and Qian, 2020). A technique often used for binary road variables is
difference in differences estimation, sometimes combined with propensity score matching
to allow the common trend assumption to hold conditional on covariates (Lokshin and
Yemtsov, 2005; Mu and van de Walle, 2011). Regression discontinuity designs have been
used to study road impacts where investment decisions were made based on whether
localities exceeded a threshold at some priority measure. Examples include program
evaluations in Sierra Leone (Casaburi, Glennerster and Suri, 2013) and India (Aggarwal,
2018; Adukia, Asher and Novosad, 2020; Asher and Novosad, 2020).
Where panel data is available, another approach to address potential endogeneity in
road works is to use village or household fixed effects (Gibson and Olivia, 2010; Khandker,
Bakht and Koolwal, 2009; Khandker and Koolwal, 2010) to assess the impact of road
investments over the period covered by the panel. The fixed effects approach accounts for
endogeneity caused by time-invariant characteristics of the location. The availability of
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multiple time periods further allows instrumentation using lagged outcomes (Dercon et al.,
2009; Khandker and Koolwal, 2011). In this chapter, we apply a correlated random effects
model as a way to incorporate village fixed effects. This approach is widely applicable
in contexts where repeated measurements are available for the road variables but not for
household data.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.1 we discuss the
country context of the study and explain the data we use. Section 4.2 outlines the
estimation techniques we use. In section 4.3 we present and discuss estimation results. In
section 4.4, we offer some concluding points.
4.1 Data and Context
With a population of roughly 8.9 million people in 2020, PNG is the largest and most
populated country of the Pacific region. During the years covered by the data used in
this study (1996 to 2010), PNG’s real per capita growth was moderate—averaging 2.6%
per year—and poverty incidence even grew by two percentage points to roughly 40% of
the population (Gibson, 2012). During that time period, the share of PNG’s population
living in rural areas has remained constant at around 87% according to the 2011 census,
of which around 90% largely relied on (semi-)subsistence agriculture (see Table 4.1.1).
Development and maintenance of PNG’s road network suffered during the two decades
following independence, when funding for road maintenance fell by half (Kwa, Howes and
Lin, 2010). Existing roads generally fell into disrepair and there was very low investment
in new roads. Government expenditure on infrastructure per capita reached its minimum
in 2001, but large and sustained increases in funding only began in 2010 (Dornan, 2016).
Beside low government revenues, a number of other factors have made it difficult to build
and maintain roads during this period: limited road management capacity in the private
sector due to unsteady provision of maintenance contracts, competition for construction
equipment and skilled engineers between resource extraction enterprises and the Depart-
ment of Works, and disputes with owners of land proximate to road works (Lucius, 2010).
Alongside these practical obstacles to implementation, a lack of political will due to the
low visibility of road investments (compared to health or education spending) as well as
high levels of corruption contributed to the insufficient maintenance of the road network
(Dornan, 2016). Lastly, PNG’s climate and geography, with its rugged topography, seis-
mic activity, intense weathering, and high seasonal rainfall in many regions—especially
in the densely populated agricultural heartland of the Highlands region—make road con-
struction and maintenance challenging (Stead, 1990).
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Two nationally representative cross-sectional household surveys conducted in PNG—
the 1996 Papua New Guinea Household Survey (PNGHS 96) and the 2009–2010 Household
Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES 09/10)—provide the primary source of data on
household consumption and other indicators used in this study. The 1996 household
survey included a nationally representative sample of 830 rural households in 73 census
units (villages). The 2009 survey collected information from 2,208 rural households in 125
villages. We also make use of variables from the PNG Census 2000 Community Profile
System (CPS 2000), which contains information on the location and population of all
villages and towns from the census of 2000. This allows us to locate all the villages in
the two surveys as points on a map.2 The HIES 09/10 includes GPS coordinates of all
surveyed households, allowing us to calculate fairly precise household-specific distances to
the nearest road. In addition, we make use of the Papua New Guinea Resource Information
System (PNGRIS) of the PNG National Agricultural Research Institute. This spatial
database contains information on elevation, climate, and other biophysical characteristics
which we include as control variables in our analysis.
For data on the status of road infrastructure over time, we rely on the road informa-
tion data bank and the geographical information system of the Road Asset Management
System (RAMS). The RAMS project, initiated in 1998 by the PNG Department of Works
(DoW), was designed to provide a road database and analytical tool to inform policy mak-
ers about road needs and economic efficiency of investments in the road network (Jusi
et al., 2003). We link initial RAMS data—based on road surveys conducted between 1999
and 2001—to the PNGHS 96 (we refer to the combined data as the 2000 map). Due to
continued underinvestment in the transport sector, certain dimensions of the RAMS—
particularly its traffic counts (vital to estimating a road’s value)—were not updated after
2001. However, the provincial works managers of the DoW were given financial support
to update data on road quality, and data collected by DoW provide the basis for our
dataset of roads in 2009. The road system consisted of roughly 26,000 km of roads in
2009. We link this dataset to the HIES 09/10 and refer to it as the 2009 map.3
2Since the PNGHS 96 used sampling based on census units from the census of 1990, on which data is
unavailable, we first had to recode the 1990 census units. For this, we relied on the census unit names
listed in Gibson and Rozelle (1998) as well as the generous help of staff at the National Statistical Office
of PNG. The HIES 09/10 was sampled from the census of 2000, which made locating the census units
straightforward.
3The two road datasets offer slightly different spatial representations of common road segments, with
positional differences ranging up to several hundred meters. To ensure that our analysis is not influenced
by differences in the coverage and spatial representation of the road network across the two years, we use
the representation of the 2009 map for both maps. That means that we have to include the information
on surface type and road condition of 2000 in the 2009 road map. We match roads based on road section
IDs, and where those are missing, on spatial proximity. It should also be mentioned that we cannot
make use of the most detailed survey of the national road network to date, the Comprehensive Visual
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Both the 2000 and 2009 road maps include detailed information for each road segment.
Most importantly, surface type (sealed, gravel, dirt) and condition (good, fair, poor) are
given for all segments.4 The 2009 road map has much more extensive coverage of the
road network—covering an additional 14,000 km of roads not included in the 2000 map,
consisting mostly of gravel or dirt feeder roads. However, within our study period the
focus of road works in PNG was on maintenance and upgrading, and reportedly no new
roads were constructed during this period (World Food Programme and Logistics Cluster,
2011; also confirmed in discussions with several informants at the DoW). This leads us
to conclude that the higher density of roads depicted in the 2009 map is a result of an
improvement of the information contained in the map, rather than the construction of
new roads.
Figures 4.1.1 maps the roads, distinguished by surface type, comprising identified
stretches of the national network in 2000 and 2009. A comparison of the maps shows that
most of the missing road segments in 2000 are classified as dirt roads in 2009. This is
in part due to the fact that the additional roads on the 2009 map are made up almost
entirely of provincial roads, which were more likely than national roads to have a dirt
surface. Section 4.A.1 in the appendix contains descriptive statistics of the road network
for both years, as well as transition matrices of surface type and condition for those roads
included in both maps. They do not reveal an apparent trend in road development, in
that the length of roads upgraded or improved is roughly offset by roads that deteriorated.
Using data from the road maps and household surveys, we construct variables indicat-
ing the length, surface types and condition of the road leading to the nearest town for the
sampled households. We consider the shortest route to the nearest town from the stretch
of road that is closest to the household. This route may not be a perfect representation
for the roads used by surveyed households—as sometimes the nearest town may not be
the most relevant—but we believe that it is a useful heuristic nonetheless. For this route,
we calculate the distance for each type of surface and road condition.5 For our analysis,
we focus on households that are connected to a town by a road. We exclude households
Road Condition Survey, which was collected in 2014 by the Papua New Guinea-Australia Transport
Sector Support Program (TSSP) together with the DoW. Due to the sudden heavy rise in national road
investments starting in 2011, we believe that the conditions in this new survey do not adequately reflect
the conditions around the time the HIES 09/10 was conducted.
4Guidelines for the interpretation of the classifications of road condition are provided
in the CAPE-PNG-9-Transport-Sector-Assessment (https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-
documents/CAPE-PNG-9-Transport-Sector-Assessment.pdf). A road segment is labeled “good” if it is
passable for a two-wheel vehicle in wet weather, “fair” if it requires periodic maintenance, and “poor” if
it requires reconstruction or rehabilitation.
5Details on the construction of this variable, as well as a discussion of remote sensing as an alternative
to identify road quality and surface type, can be found in the appendix of Edmonds et al. (2018).
114 CHAPTER 4. ROADS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Figure 4.1.1: Roads by surface type in 2000 and 2009
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that are located more than 15 km from any road as it seems unlikely that they use the
nearest road regularly, making road quality unlikely to have a significant impact. Fur-
thermore, we consider only towns that had more than 1,000 inhabitants according to the
census 2011 and are within 5 km of the nearest road.6 Taken together, these restrictions
mean that about 20% of the rural census units in the two surveys are dropped from our
analysis. The villages left out are mostly either on small islands (where roads may be of
little or no importance anyway), or in the deep interior in the west of the Momase region
or at the coast of Western province (both of which have a very low population density).
Due to the fact that our road map of 2000 is less detailed than the 2009 map, we
have missing information on surface type and condition for some of the road segments
of 2000. For the routes used in the analysis, this information was lacking for 24% of the
total distance. For that reason, we drop observations where all road segments leading to
the nearest town have unknown characteristics for 2000. This leaves a total of 20% of the
total distance unknown for 2000. For the remaining observations, we simply assign the
segments with unknown characteristics for 2000 the same characteristics as for 2009. We
discuss the implications of this decision in section 4.3.
Table 4.1.1 provides summary statistics for our sample. It includes geographic and
road access variables that were merged with the household survey data. Both house-
hold surveys include sections that allow calculation of per adult-equivalent household
expenditure—based on a closed interval recall method in the PNGHS 96, and on con-
sumption diaries in the HIES 09/10—as well as regional poverty lines based on the cost of
locally consumed foods.7 Across the two household surveys, average per adult-equivalent
consumption decreased and poverty incidence increased slightly. School enrollment in-
creased by more than 14 percentage points, and average years of schooling of adults
increased by almost one year. Households in the 2009/10 HIES were slightly older (higher
average age of household members), smaller (with nearly one person less, on average), and
lived closer to the nearest town, compared to the households in the PNGHS 96. These
differences could indicate demographic changes, but are more likely caused by differences
in the sampling schemes for the two surveys. Table 4.1.1 also shows the distances by
6The latter criterion leads to the exclusion of three settlements that can only be reached by water.
All towns with more than 1,000 inhabitants in 2011 were already towns in 2000.
7We construct per capita expenditure as well as regional poverty lines as explained in Gibson and
Rozelle (1998) and Gibson (2012). Particularly, we use the revised consumption figures, poverty lines,
and sampling weights for the PNGHS 96 explained in Gibson (2012) to make expenditure and poverty
comparable between the two surveys. For the HIES 09/10, Gibson (2012) suggests three different con-
sumption figures. Due to evidence of diary fatigue, we use the figure based on the shortest time horizon
(7 days). The poverty lines we use take the cost of a locally consumed food basket and add the non-food
spending of households whose food expenditures exactly meet this cost (Olson Lanjouw and Lanjouw,
2001).
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Table 4.1.1: Summary statistics for the analysis sample
1996 2009/10
Mean SD N Mean SD N p-value
Outcomes (PNGHS 96, HIES 09/10)
Log real per adult-equivalent expenditure 0.309 0.560 680 0.157 0.946 1,473 0.033
Poverty 0.347 0.376 680 0.429 0.583 1,473 0.045
Engaged in subsistence farming 0.889 0.253 680 0.914 0.318 1,643 0.399
Someone in the household has wage job 0.243 0.346 680 0.137 0.390 1,632 0.003
Home has a good roof 0.244 0.346 680 0.285 0.512 1,643 0.205
Ratio of children aged 7-17 going to school 0.445 0.325 484 0.589 0.491 1,054 0.000
Location-specific control variables (PNGRIS)
Altitude (m) 1003 595 680 1185 951 1,643 0.013
Dummy, slope > 10 degrees 0.634 0.388 680 0.664 0.536 1,643 0.718
Dummy, land inundation occurs 0.236 0.342 680 0.240 0.485 1,643 0.955
Dummy, rainfall deficit is rare 0.290 0.366 680 0.322 0.530 1,643 0.695
Annual rainfall (m) 2.640 0.513 680 2.650 0.813 1,643 0.929
Log population nearest town (Census) 8.615 1.007 680 8.805 1.407 1,643 0.374
Household controls (PNGHS 96, HIES 09/10)
Household size 5.839 2.438 680 4.906 2.785 1,643 0.000
Ratio of household members under 15 0.406 0.208 680 0.352 0.263 1,643 0.000
Ratio of household members above 50 0.104 0.172 680 0.127 0.268 1,643 0.117
Age of household head 40.75 10.32 680 42.47 15.61 1,643 0.032
Household head is female 0.094 0.235 680 0.148 0.402 1,643 0.006
Household head is literate 0.525 0.403 680 0.473 0.567 1,642 0.192
Average years of schooling 3.392 2.389 680 4.373 3.993 1,633 0.000
Ratio of children in primary school age 0.602 0.302 484 0.583 0.433 1,054 0.469
Impact variables (obtained from road maps)
Distance to nearest road (km) 0.609 1.234 680 0.907 2.141 1,643 0.262
Distance on road to nearest town (km) 49.99 39.03 680 36.57 39.07 1,643 0.044
Road to town: km of sealed road 16.10 21.15 680 14.68 28.48 1,643 0.751
Road to town: km of gravel road 30.47 27.67 680 17.69 24.67 1,643 0.007
Road to town: km of dirt road 3.428 6.206 680 4.199 10.92 1,643 0.589
Summary statistics of log real per adult-equivalent expenditure and poverty are obtained using
person sampling weights. All other ones are obtained using household sampling weights. Standard
deviations and p-values account for clustering at the village level. The p-values show the probability
of equal means.
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surface type for the routes leading from the sampled households to the nearest town, as
measured by us using the road maps and household locations.
We use six different outcome variables in our regressions of road quality. The first one
is the same one as used in Gibson and Rozelle (2003): the logarithm of real yearly con-
sumption per adult-equivalent.8 We divide yearly consumption by the respective regional
rural poverty lines to calculate real consumption. A similar outcome variable is poverty
status. We include it as our second outcome to examine specifically how the probability
of being poor is affected by road infrastructure.
In addition to consumption, we are also interested in the effects of infrastructure on
rural employment and structural transformation. One common change observed among
rural households as a result of improved access to markets is reduced dependence on
subsistence farming. Therefore, our third outcome is whether members of the household
reported engaging in subsistence farming in the days prior to the survey date.9 Another
indicator of structural change is having a wage job. Accordingly, we use a dummy for
whether at least one member of the household is employed in a non-agricultural sector
as fourth outcome variable. We expect that better roads improve off-farm earning op-
portunities and therefore reduce the necessity for subsistence agriculture and increase the
likelihood of formal employment.
Another indicator of material well-being is housing quality.10 Traditional dwellings,
with walls made of bush material and with grass or leaf roofs, are cheap to come by but
have a relatively low service life. So, investments in non-traditional housing materials may
signify not only an immediate improvement of living conditions but also an intention to
stay in a given location more permanently. Due to the lack of credible and intertemporally
comparable housing value estimates, we chose to use a dummy indicating whether the
house has a good roof, i.e., a roof made of metal, tiles, or cement. If improved road access
leads to better opportunities and living conditions and reduces transportation costs, we
would expect more good roofs due to better access to roofing materials as well as higher
demand for them.
Lastly, we examine the school enrollment ratio of children at school age. Our hypoth-
8Like Gibson and Rozelle (2003), we assign children aged between 0 and 6 years a weight of 0.5, while
children older than 6 years as well as adults are assigned a weight of 1.
9The definitions vary slightly between survey rounds. For the PNGHS 96, the variable indicates that
in the two weeks prior to the survey, at least one household member engaged in the production of sago,
bananas, corn, sweet potato, cassava, taro, or other fresh fruits or vegetables without selling them. For
the HIES 09/10, the variable indicates that in the week prior to the survey, at least one household member
engaged in agricultural production for own consumption. The means of both variables are very close, as
shown in Table 4.1.1.
10Measures of housing quality were left out in the construction of the consumption figures (Gibson,
2012), so are not part of the first two outcome variables.
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esis is that school enrollment increases with better road infrastructure due to easier access
to schools for both children and teachers.
4.2 Estimation
To estimate the causal relationship between the quality of the road infrastructure and our
outcomes of interest, we propose a linear model of the form
yijt = βRjt + γDj + δXijt + µj + πpt + εijt, (4.2.1)
where yijt is an outcome for household i in village j at time t, Rjt and Dj are vectors
of variables related to road infrastructure, Xijt is a vector of exogenous control variables
(at the household- and the village level), µj denotes unobserved, time-invariant hetero-
geneity at the village level, πpt is a province-time-fixed effect, and εijt is an independent
disturbance term.
We include two types of road infrastructure variables. Dj includes the Euclidean
distance to the nearest road and the distance on that road leading to the closest town
with a 2010 population above 1,000 people. Since we assume no new roads were added
between 1996 and 2010, these distance variables are time-invariant. Rjt captures the
combined length of road segments of a particular type on the route between surveyed
households and the nearest town. Since these distances add up to the total distance
traveled on that road to the nearest town, which is already included in Dj, we leave out
the lowest quality category of road type. This means that the coefficients in β give the
welfare impact of changing a kilometer of road from the lowest quality type to the other
types. Road segments are upgraded, left to deteriorate, or remain the same type over
time, so Rjt is time-varying.
Since there is no overlap in sampled villages between the two surveys, we cannot differ-
ence out the term µj, and treating it as a random effect uncorrelated with all independent
variables might lead to a biased estimate of β. Instead, we use the correlated random
effects approach introduced by Mundlak (1978). The idea is to substitute µj with the
mean of Rjt over t, R̄j∗, and an independent village random effect, ωj:
µj = αR̄j∗ + ωj. (4.2.2)
Rjt is uncorrelated with ωj + εijt. This combined disturbance term is also independent
between nearby localities, as any spatial correlation is captured by πpt and R̄j∗. Since
distance variables Dj are time-invariant, they cannot be included in the model of µj and
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are assumed to be conditionally exogenous. The model is estimated using OLS and takes
into account the survey design, i.e., sampling weights11, stratum divisions, and standard
error clustering by village. To reduce collinearity between the endogenous variables and
their respective intertemporal averages, we estimate equation (4.2.1) using centered terms
Rjt− R̄j∗ instead of Rjt to reflect variables in terms of their deviations from averages over
time.
We include a number of location-specific control variables. Among these are the
geoclimatic variables used in Gibson and Rozelle (2003)—namely, altitude (in meters),
a dummy for whether the slope is above 10 degrees, a dummy indicating that the land
is subject to flooding, a dummy indicating that rainfall deficits are rare, and annual
rainfall (in meters). To control for the economic importance of the nearest town, we also
include the logarithm of its population as measured in the census closest to the survey
year.12 Population numbers could be endogenous, say, because more productive areas
could enhance household welfare as well as faster population growth. To account for this
potential source of endogeneity, we also include the average of log population in equation
(4.2.2).
We also include some household-level controls. This demands caution, however, since
changes in road access could alter household characteristics. An example for such an
endogenous household variable is the sector of work, which could change as a result
of new opportunities created by improved road access, and thus cannot be included.
We select a parsimonious set of variables that describes the composition and education
level of adults in the household (see Table 4.1.1). We report results with and without
these household controls for equation (4.2.1). Province-time fixed effects are included
to control for differences in outcomes due to unobserved factors such as local economic
conditions, and the ability and political will to build, maintain, and upgrade roads. They
constitute particularly effective controls since the roads to the nearest town, while not
having geographical point locations, are for almost all observations located within the
same province or at least have the largest part in the province as the corresponding
villages.
With regard to road types, we explore specifications with different levels of detail. A
simple way to capture road quality is to consider only the surface type, i.e., whether a
road is sealed, graveled, or a dirt track. A more detailed categorization of road segments
11The sampling weights used in the regressions of consumption and poverty status are person-specific,
those in the regressions of schooling are children-specific, and those in the other regression are household-
specific.
12We take the population size for 1996 from the 2000 census, and the population size for 2009/10 from
the 2011 census.
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includes surface type together with road condition, i.e., whether a road is in good, fair, or
poor shape. In this chapter, the focus is on the results of the analysis using only surface
type. The more detailed model is consistent with the simpler model but shows no clear
effects of road condition, likely due to a lack of statistical power as well as differences
in the way road condition was assessed across time and between provinces. The results
using road condition can be found in section 4.A.2 in the appendix.
Our model specification rests on the assumption that all unobserved factors below
the province level which both contribute to the respective outcomes and are correlated
with road infrastructure are location-specific and fixed over the period between the two
surveys. This may look like a daring presumption given the 13-year period between
surveys. Although overall rural economic output and poverty have stagnated over the
study period, some areas may have gained or lost in population or economic importance in
those years, potentially affecting infrastructure as well as household welfare. We attempt
to capture changes in local economic conditions by including the province-time dummies
and town population numbers. With these precautions, we believe that time-invariant
cluster-level heterogeneity is a reasonable assumption.
A caveat is that we cannot model selective migration that occurs in response to changes
in road quality. This is a potential source of bias for most studies on the benefits of
infrastructure; even when panel data is available, the whereabouts of individual migrat-
ing household members are seldom recorded. The actual effects of rural road quality
on migration are unclear, with some evidence pointing to reduced out-migration (Cas-
taing Gachassin, 2013), while other recent studies find no significant effects (Aggarwal,
2018; Asher and Novosad, 2020). In section 4.A.3 in the appendix, we look at correlations
between our road variables and indicators of migration in PNG, which all turn out small
and statistically insignificant. Given this, we believe that selective migration does not
bias our estimates to a degree that would invalidate them.
In addition to the average welfare effects of rural roads, we are also interested in
whether rural roads affect all households in the same manner. One open question is
whether high education levels are complementary to road infrastructure, or whether it
is mostly low-skilled labor that becomes more productive through better roads. Other
sources of effect heterogeneity might be the gender and age of household members. For
example, additional opportunities created by roads may help empower women and thereby
have a larger effect on their consumption. Poor quality or lacking road infrastructure may
trap older people and diminish their prospects more than those of young people due to
physical constraints on walking long distances or transiting rough roads. The marginal
effects of road quality may also differ between households who live close to a town and
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those who do not. To investigate whether this type of impact heterogeneity exists, we
follow Dercon et al. (2009) and divide our sample in two subsamples to estimate the
model separately by subsample. We define the subsamples on the basis of: (i) whether
the road distance to the nearest town is more than 30 km, (ii) whether the average years of
education for household members at least 18 years old is larger than 4 years, (iii) whether
the household head is female, and (iv) whether the ratio of household members above 50
exceeds 30%.
Last of all, we explore effect heterogeneity across the distribution of real consumption,
which the impact estimates on poverty status do not capture. The effect of roads on
poverty is driven by relatively few households around the poverty line. However, we are
also interested in how relatively poor households are affected by infrastructure compared
to relatively well-off households. To this end, we employ quantile regressions.
The principal idea of quantile regression is that unlike in the least squares regression
framework, it is not the conditional expectation but a conditional quantile of the outcome
that is a linear function of the covariates. The τ th quantile of consumption yijt conditional
on road quality Rjt is expressed in the linear quantile function q (Rjt, τ) = β (τ)Rjt. Each










∼ U (0, 1) , (4.2.3)
where U∗
ijt
is a non-separable disturbance term normalized to a standard uniform distri-
bution. U∗
ijt
determines the rank of the outcome within the conditional distribution, and
is what causes heterogeneity in outcomes conditional on Rjt.
Khandker, Bakht and Koolwal (2009) and Khandker and Koolwal (2010) use quan-
tile regressions in their studies of road infrastructure. Similarly to our estimation above,
they include correlated random effect terms as covariates in their quantile regressions to
account for unobserved heterogeneity. The issue with this approach is that including con-
trol variables in a quantile regression model alters its interpretation. For instance, the τ th
consumption quantile for households with good roads is not the same as the τ th quantile
for households with good roads and low levels of education. Using a similar reasoning,
including the correlated random effect terms—and thereby, implicitly, an approximation
to the location-specific fixed effect—yields an interpretation different from the one as-
sociated with model (4.2.3). On the other hand, not conditioning on controls and the
correlated random effect terms likely creates biased estimates. It requires the assumption
that U∗
ijt
is independent of Rjt, which is quite strong, and likely holds only conditionally
on covariates.
To circumvent this problem, we apply a generalized quantile regression (GQR) model,
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as introduced by Powell (2020). Here, outcomes are modeled by the same quantile func-
tion as in (4.2.3), but the disturbance term U∗
ijt
is itself dependent on covariates Cijt.
GQR jointly estimates β (τ) and the conditional quantile P (yijt ≤ Rjtβ (τ)|Cijt). The
covariates are thus used to predict the position in the conditional outcome distribution.
This way, including control variables in the model does not alter the causal interpretation
of the quantile impact estimates of road quality.
For our model, we focus on the distances by surface type Rjt, while the time-invariant
distances to the nearest road and to the nearest town, Dj, are included in the set of
covariates Cijt. The main reason is that the more variables are conditioned on, the lower
is the variance of the conditional outcome distributions, and the lower is the difference
between quantile effects. So, if we considered the outcome distribution conditional on
both Rjt and Dj, we would not expect to see much effect heterogeneity. As further control
variables we include everything we controlled for in our most detailed specification above,
which includes location- and household-specific control variables, province-time dummies,
and the Mundlak terms R̄j∗. For estimation, we use the Stata routine genqreg for all
quantiles from 1 to 99. To obtain 95% confidence intervals we apply a cluster bootstrap
at the village level.
4.3 Results
Our main estimation results, based on equation (4.2.1), are summarized in Tables 4.3.1 to
4.3.3. For each outcome variable, we estimate three specifications. Specification 1 is a lin-
ear regression of the model specified in equation (4.2.1), without household level controls
and without Mundlak terms. Specification 2 includes household-level control variables.
Specification 3 in addition contains the Mundlak terms. The first two specifications allow
to examine the effect that time-varying control variables have on the main coefficients.
As these lead to considerable improvements in fit while leaving the coefficients of road-
related variables nearly unchanged, we are not worried about them being endogenous to
the model. Furthermore, the Mundlak terms in specification 3 are jointly statistically sig-
nificant for four of the six outcomes. Accordingly, the third specification is our preferred
one. For the analyses by subgroups and the quantile regressions we use this one as well.
To account for the fact that we test multiple hypotheses, we compute sharpened False
Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values using the two-stage procedure described in Anderson
(2008), in addition to p-values. The q-values (in square brackets) indicate the smallest
level at which the coefficient in question would be significant, given the p-values of the
simultaneously tested hypotheses. We apply this correction using all road quality variables
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and all outcomes together, but separately for each specification.
Table 4.3.1 shows the impact of road condition variables on log real per adult-equivalent
consumption and poverty status. The results indicate that improved road conditions have
a positive impact on consumption. An upgrade of one kilometer of dirt road to sealed
road on the route to the nearest town leads to a 3.2% increase in household consumption.
Upgrading one kilometer of gravel road to sealed road increases consumption by 2.2%.
The difference between dirt and gravel roads is positive but not significant. Similarly,
transforming a kilometer of dirt road to sealed road reduces the probability to be poor by
1.3 percentage points, an upgrade to gravel road reduces it by about 1.1 percentage points.
The effects of sealing dirt roads on consumption and poverty hold up to the scrutiny of
FDR q-values, while the effects of graveling dirt roads have q-values slightly above 10%.
Table 4.3.2 presents estimates of the impact of road type on the likelihood of engage-
ment in subsistence farming and in wage employment. The point estimates of the effects
on these two outcomes indicate that better quality roads facilitate the structural trans-
formation from subsistence farming to economic activities that are more integrated into
local markets. In particular, a one kilometer change of road surface from gravel to sealed
reduces the probability that a member of the household engages in subsistence farming by
around 0.6 percentage points. For wage employment, the picture is less clear. It appears
that turning gravel into sealed roads actually reduces the probability that a household
member has a wage job. But the Mundlak terms in specification 3 are jointly insignificant
with a p-value of 0.93, so including them might only drive up coefficient variability with-
out reducing bias. Indeed, when leaving the Mundlak terms out, the effects break down to
zero. In summary, better roads drive people out of subsistence farming and presumably
toward cultivation of cash crops, as opposed to non-agricultural employment.
Table 4.3.3 shows the effects on the likelihood of having a good roof and of school
enrollment of children between 7 and 17. We find clear signs that improvements in roads
lead to investment in housing. A one kilometer increase in gravel versus dirt roads raises
the probability of having a good roof by around 1.3 percentage points. The same holds for
sealed versus dirt roads, even though the latter result is marginally insignificant. These
findings are unsurprising given the high transportation costs of tiles or corrugated sheet
metal. Finally, upgrading one kilometer of dirt road on the route to the nearest town to
sealed or gravel appears to increase the probability of a school-aged child to be enrolled
in school by 1.4 and 1.6 percentage points, respectively. However, the FDR q-values for
this last result are slightly above the 10% significance threshold, making it a somewhat
speculative finding.
The magnitude of some of the effects per kilometer of changed surface type appears




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































quite large, given a median of 29 km to the nearest town for our sample. This can in part
be attributed to the long observation period of 14 years, which may have compounded the
differences in outcomes between households with better and worse roads. More impor-
tantly, the estimates are identified over a road system with relatively few changes over the
years (see the transition matrix in Table 4.A.2 in the appendix). The marginal effects of
those changes are likely somewhat diminishing: road planners can be expected to main-
tain and upgrade road segments with an eye to necessity or expected gains. Our estimates
are thus not the effect of random changes in road quality, but of the kind of changes that
actually occurred during the study period. The high magnitude of our findings seems to
confirm the underfunded state of PNG’s road policy at the time.
Another reason for a possible bias of our estimates away from zero lies in the way
we handle road segments with missing road surface in the 2000 map. Since we assign
the same surface type as the corresponding segments in the 2009 map to the missing
segments, it is possible that actual changes along the route are biased downwards, leading
to an overestimation of marginal effects. We repeat all the estimations but gradually
exclude households with more than 50%, 20%, 5%, and 0% of segments missing on their
shortest route to the nearest town, thereby respectively reducing the estimation sample
to about 85%, 63%, 42%, and 20% of its original size. For all the outcomes and all but the
last sample reduction, the results remain qualitatively the same and remain statistically
significant, with most estimates even further away from zero than the original. Regression
tables are omitted here but are available on request. The exercise indicates that our
treatment of missing segments does not have a major effect on the results.
Next, we discuss the estimates disaggregated by subgroups of households to study
heterogeneous effects of road quality. We only consider the models of consumption and
poverty, since these are the key outcome variables of this chapter. The results are reported
in Tables 4.3.4 and 4.3.5, with the subsample defined in the top row. In the third row
from the bottom of the tables, we report estimated correlation coefficients between the
outcome variables and subset identifiers. In the last two rows, we provide p-values of Wald
tests of the equality of the surface material coefficients between the two subsamples, and
of the same for the coefficients of all road variables, respectively.
We find clear differences when effects are estimated for households distinguished by
distance to the nearest town. Households living farther than 30 km to the nearest town
benefit more from dirt road upgrades than those living closer, both in terms of consump-
tion as well as the likelihood of being poor. It appears that for shorter trips road quality
plays a minor role, while for longer distances the travel cost differences between better and
worse roads may prove pivotal for the decision to make a trip more often, with measurable
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Figure 4.3.1: Road type coefficients by consumption quantile
consequences for material well-being. A short distance to the nearest road, on the other
hand, is more relevant to those households living closer to the nearest town. Furthermore,
it appears that the likelihood of being poor is less affected by road upgrades for female-
led households than for male-led ones, and that households with a comparatively higher
share of older household members seem to benefit more from better roads, though the
differences in surface coefficients are not jointly significant. Since low consumption and
poverty status are positively correlated with remoteness and relatively more older house-
hold members, these results also indicate that poorer groups benefit more from better
roads.
Last of all, we present the results of the generalized quantile regressions examining
the effect of road quality on log per adult-equivalent consumption. Figure 4.3.1 shows
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the marginal effects of the difference of one kilometer of road between dirt and gravel,
gravel and sealed, and dirt and sealed, for each quantile from 1 to 99. The confidence
bands come from our cluster bootstrap. All the control variables from the prior regression
models as well as the Mundlak terms are included.
The effect of the difference between a kilometer of sealed and dirt road is on average
relatively larger for the lowest 20 quantiles and relatively lower for the highest 20. The
average effect on log consumption for the former is 0.041, while it is 0.007 for the latter.
Similarly, the effect of the difference between gravel and dirt road is decreasing along the
income distribution, with an average effect of 0.030 for the poorest 20 quantiles and 0.001
for the richest 20. However, the large confidence bands generated by the bootstrapping
procedure mean that these trends are not statistically significant. We interpret the results
from the GQR model as limited evidence that upgrading dirt roads disproportionately
benefits the poorest households in PNG and may thus be regarded a pro-poor policy
measure.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examine the effects of the quality of PNG’s road network on rural
household welfare over a 13-year period. We find evidence that upgrading roads leads to
improvements in household welfare, housing quality, and school enrollment. The effects
on consumption and poverty are higher for disadvantaged and more remote households.
This finding complements the argument by Gibson and Rozelle (2003) that due to the
sparse road network and the remoteness of many poor households, infrastructure spending
may be one of the few feasible targeted antipoverty measures in PNG. Our results also
show that upgrading roads supports the structural transformation of households away
from subsistence farming and toward market-oriented activities. This is consistent with
the inhomogeneous impact on consumption and suggests that connecting rural households
to local markets particularly benefits smallholder farmers.
Our identification strategy makes only use of existing administrative road inventory
data in combination with repeated cross-sectional household surveys. These kinds of
datasets are available for many other countries. Our method thus easily lends itself for
replication elsewhere, and again in PNG after the next national household survey has
been conducted.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Road Summary Statistics
Table 4.A.1 shows the road lengths and conditions of PNG’s road network for 2000 and
2009. Tables 4.A.2 and 4.A.3 show the transitions in surface type and condition between
the two years for those segments that are included in both maps. The tables reveal
no consistent trend in road development. Considering change in surface type, we observe
that the length of roads upgraded (i.e., changes from gravel to sealed surface) was roughly
offset by roads that deteriorated (gravel to dirt). The characterization of road condition
captured in the 2000 and 2009 maps shows substantial improvement (most notably, road
condition improving from poor to fair) alongside decline (mainly from good to fair).
Table 4.A.4 is an extension of Table 4.1.1, showing summary statistics of surface type
and condition for the roads to the nearest town. It is noteworthy that for the average
household, the route to the nearest town is better than the average PNG road as shown
in Table 4.1.1, signified by the higher shares of sealed and gravel roads.
Table 4.A.1: Extent and surface type/condition of the
main PNG road network in 2000 and 2009
2000 2009
Surface Condition Length (km) Share Length (km) Share
Sealed Good 911 7.8% 1,799 7.0%
Sealed Fair 914 7.8% 1,067 4.2%
Sealed Poor 314 2.7% 371 1.5%
Gravel Good 2,137 18.3% 1,096 4.3%
Gravel Fair 1,649 14.1% 7,300 28.6%
Gravel Poor 4,232 36.3% 5,726 22.4%
Dirt Good 223 1.9% 166 0.7%
Dirt Fair 63 0.5% 3,660 14.3%
Dirt Poor 1,230 10.5% 4,332 17.0%
All All 11,672 100% 25,517 100%
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Table 4.A.2: Transition matrix comparing road
segment surface types in 2000 and 2009
Sealed ’09 Gravel ’09 Dirt ’09 Total
Sealed ’00 1,821 226 93 2,139
Gravel ’00 683 6,502 832 8,017
Dirt ’00 27 304 1,185 1,516
Total 2,531 7,031 2,110 11,672
Reported in km. Only listed for stretches where surface
type is known in 2000.
Table 4.A.3: Transition matrix comparing road
segment conditions in 2000 and 2009
Good ’09 Fair ’09 Poor ’09 Total
Good ’00 1,077 1,531 662 3,270
Fair ’00 925 970 731 2,626
Poor ’00 457 2,994 2,326 5,776
Total 2,458 5,495 3,719 11,672
Reported in km. Only listed for stretches where
road condition is known in 2000.
Table 4.A.4: Summary statistics of road surface type and condition for the analysis sample
1996 2009/10
Mean SD N Mean SD N p-value
Impact variables (obtained from road maps)
Road to town: km of good sealed road 7.907 12.61 680 7.740 16.35 1,643 0.949
Road to town: km of fair sealed road 6.834 13.16 680 5.900 15.70 1,643 0.717
Road to town: km of poor sealed road 1.355 1.962 680 1.041 3.660 1,643 0.504
Road to town: km of good gravel road 7.315 8.773 680 2.792 8.045 1,643 0.004
Road to town: km of fair gravel road 10.53 12.78 680 11.09 18.36 1,643 0.830
Road to town: km of poor gravel road 12.62 17.20 680 3.801 10.82 1,643 0.009
Road to town: km of good dirt road 0.029 0.205 680 0 0 1,643 0.304
Road to town: km of fair dirt road 1.696 3.282 680 2.934 8.938 1,643 0.223
Road to town: km of poor dirt road 1.703 4.707 680 1.265 5.815 1,643 0.626
Road summary statistics are obtained using household sampling weights. Standard devia-
tions and p-values account for clustering at the village level. The p-values show the probability
of equal means.
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4.A.2 Impact Analysis of Surface Type and Condition
Beside the regressions on road surface type, we also consider a more detailed set of specifi-
cations that consider surface type and road condition. This leaves us with nine categories
of road segments (all combinations of sealed, gravel, dirt, and good, fair, poor), some of
which are empty or have very few observations. To avoid including variables with lit-
tle variation, we lump together road categories that accounted for less than 5% of total
length. Accordingly, we combine fair and poor sealed roads into one category, and com-
bine good, fair, and poor dirt roads into another category. The excluded category for the
regressions is dirt road. The results are summarized in Tables 4.A.5 to 4.A.7, which are
the equivalents of Tables 4.3.1 to 4.3.3 in the main text. Conditional on surface type, we
see no significant differences in effects by road condition. This does not mean that road
condition has no effect. We believe that a combination of insufficient statistical power
and quality of the road condition data is responsible for this null result. Road condition
can change quickly in PNG, and the way it was assessed likely varied over time and across
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4.A.3 Selective Migration
To check whether better roads and migration within PNG are correlated, we regress two
indicators of migration on our road variables. The first variable is the ratio of prime-aged
men in a household, as they are the people most likely to migrate (Aggarwal, 2018). The
second variable, which is only available for the HIES 09/10, is a dummy indicating whether
anyone among the household head, the spouse, the head’s parents, or grandparents, has
moved to the current province within the last 10 years. We include location-specific
covariates and province-time fixed effects, but we do not include the Mundlak terms, as
this is not a causal analysis. Table 4.A.8 shows the regression results. It appears that
road quality is statistically insignificant for both migration indicators.
Table 4.A.8: Regressions of indicators of migration on road type and distances
Ratio of men between 18
and 40
Household member
moved to province ≤ 10
years ago
Dirt to Sealed (km) 0.0001 -0.0018
(0.773) (0.156)
Dirt to Gravel (km) 0.0001 -0.0019
(0.864) (0.104)
Total distance to nearest town (km) -0.0001 0.0013
(0.729) (0.124)
Distance to nearest road (km) 0.0013 -0.0034
(0.537) (0.694)
Household controls No No




p-value joint significance 0.958 0.231
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
p-values in parentheses, using standard errors clustered at the village level. Both regressions
are weighted using household sampling weights from both surveys. Dirt road is the excluded cat-
egory for the distance variables. Road sections observed in the 2009 maps, but not in 2000, are
assumed to remain the same over time. Both specifications also include location-specific control
variables (see Table 4.1.1) as well as province-time-fixed effects. The last row displays the p-value
of a Wald test of the joint significance of all road variables.
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Summary
The three main chapters in this dissertation cover three different topics in development
economics: education, poverty, and infrastructure. Each chapter contains both relevant
findings for the respective subject area and methodological contributions.
In chapter 2, I study the impact of a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program on
students’ decisions to continue school once the program ends. The CCT in question is
Mexico’s Progresa, which covered students only until the end of middle school when it
was introduced. I find that the program reduces the probability to transfer to high school
afterwards by about 10 to 14 percentage points. After ruling out competing explanations,
the reasons appear to be behavioral: cash crowds out the intrinsic motivation for seeking
education, and CCT programs ending early may signal that school is not worth it after a
certain point. In addition, the program had positive spillover effects on those students who
were not eligible. The program seems to have raised the desire of students from better-off
families to distinguish themselves by choosing to stay in school. Identifying the transition
probability poses a unique challenge: if Progresa has successfully kept students in
middle school, then samples of middle school graduates who received the program are
likely different from those who did not. To tackle this issue, I compare students by pre-
treatment characteristics. I apply double machine learning—a recently developed method
to identify treatment effects in the presence of a large number of potential confounders. I
extend the method to account not only for selection bias but also for non-random attrition.
This approach may prove useful in general for studying the aftereffects of programs that
impact the composition of its participants.
Chapter 3 is about participatory wealth rankings (PWRs)—a targeting method in
which representatives of a community rank households by their wealth. I demonstrate
how PWRs can be used to construct a welfare measure that reflects local perceptions
of poverty, using data from a field experiment on poverty targeting in Indonesia. The
idea is to estimate the relationship between rankings and household characteristics, via a
rank-ordered logit model, and to predict welfare scores. This makes it possible to com-
pare households from different villages, even though they have not been compared in the
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PWRs. I then estimate the impact of using this new welfare measure as targeting goal on
program satisfaction of villagers and village leaders. I find that higher targeting accuracy,
as measured by the rank-based welfare measure, significantly increases satisfaction with
an anti-poverty program. Furthermore, after controlling for targeting accuracy, the PWR
does not lead to significantly higher satisfaction than consumption-based targeting meth-
ods. Lastly, I find that targeting accuracy explains satisfaction outcomes better when it
is measured against rank-based welfare measure rather than predicted consumption. This
holds true even for communities where no PWRs had been conducted. Taken together,
the results show that taking local welfare perceptions into account leads to more satisfac-
tory targeting outcomes, while the actual procedure of meeting and ranking households
seems to matter little, if at all. This insight is useful especially for contexts in which
PWRs are not feasible.
In chapter 4, which is joint work with Eric Koomen, Menno Pradhan, and Christo-
pher Edmonds, we study the impact of road development on household welfare in rural
Papua New Guinea (PNG). Using two household surveys from 1996 and 2010 as well as
corresponding road maps, we construct road quality variables for the route connecting
households to urban areas. We use a correlated random effects model to account for
unobserved location-specific effects that might influence both road quality and house-
holds’ well-being. Our results show that upgrading the roads leading to the nearest town
increases average household consumption, housing quality, and school enrollment, and
reduces reliance on subsistence farming. An analysis by subgroups shows that the effects
on consumption and poverty are at least twice as high for households with a road dis-
tance of at least 30 km to the nearest town when comparing them to those living closer
than 30 km. Furthermore, we apply a newly developed generalized quantile regression
estimator to look for effect heterogeneity along the distribution of consumption. The es-
timates indicate that upgrading dirt roads has a higher effect for the poorest households.
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Essays in Development EconomicsThis dissertation consists of three chapters on different topics withindevelopment economics. Chapter 2 explores the question whether 
conditional cash transfer programs that end early have adverse effects 
on continued education. Looking at Mexico’s PROGRESA, where payments 
ended after middle school, the study finds that the program reduced the 
likelihood for students to continue with high school. Chapter 3 is about 
participatory wealth rankings—a poverty targeting method in which 
representatives of a community rank households by their wealth. The study 
demonstrates how such rankings can be used to construct and utilize a 
welfare measure that reflects local perceptions of poverty, based on data 
from a field experiment in Indonesia. Chapter 4 investigates the impact 
of road development on household welfare in rural Papua New Guinea. 
A special focus lies on the question whether improving roads can be viewed 
as a pro-poor policy. 
